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Abstract
We consider the agency problem of a staﬀ member managing micro￿nancing
programs, who can abuse his discretion to embezzle borrowers￿ repayments. The fact
that most borrowers of micro￿nancing programs are illiterate and live in rural areas
where transportation costs are very high make staﬀ￿s embezzlement particularly
relevant as is documented by Mknelly and Kevane (2002). We study the trade-oﬀ
between the optimal rigid lending contract and the optimal discretionary one and
￿nd that a rigid contract is optimal when the audit cost is larger than gains from
insurance. Our analysis explains rigid repayment schedules used by the Grameen
bank as an optimal response to the bank staﬀ￿s agency problem. Joint liability
reduces borrowers￿ burden of respecting the rigid repayment schedules by providing
them with partial insurance. However, the same insurance can be provided by
borrowers themselves under individual liability through a side-contract.
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The remarkable success of micro￿nance programs in making loans to (and recovering them
from) the poor has received world-wide attention and generated a global micro￿nance
movement which has been growing rapidly: according to the report from the Microcredit
Summit Campaign, by the end of 2002, 67.6 million clients were served worldwide by over
2,500 micro￿nance institutions (ArmendÆriz de Aghion and Morduch, 2005, p.3). The
original ideas of micro￿nance are due to Muhammad Yunus, the founder of the Grameen
bank, who started making small loans to groups of poor people in rural area in Bangladesh
in the 1970s. Today the Grameen bank is a large ￿nancial organization: it disbursed $
482.90 million during the 12 months from May 2004 to April 2005 to about 4.5 million
borrowers and its loan recovery rate is about 99 percent.1
Most of the existing literature on micro￿nance has centered on how group lending, in
particular joint liability, aﬀects adverse selection (Ghatak, 1999, 2000, Van Tassel, 1999,
ArmendÆriz de Aghion and Gollier 2000, Laﬀont and N￿Guessan 2000, Laﬀont, 2003),
moral hazard in terms of loan repayment (Besley and Coate, 1995, ArmendÆriz de Aghion
1999, Rai and Sj￿str￿m, 2004) and moral hazard before return realization such as work
incentive (Stiglitz 1990, Varian 1990, Conning 1999, Che 2002, Laﬀont and Rey, 2003).2
Despite the variety of the issues that the papers examine, all of them, except Conning
(1999) who studies the trade-oﬀ b e t w e e no u t r e a c ha n d￿nancial leverage, consider only
borrowers￿ incentives and do not study the incentive issues of the staﬀ managing the loans.
Furthermore, most papers consider state-contingent repayments without investigating a
staﬀ member￿s incentive to reveal his3 information about the realized state of nature to
the bank. However, corruption and embezzlement are rampant in most organizations in
underdeveloped countries4 and the Grameen bank is a large organization involving several
layers of hierarchy.5 Hence, understanding the success of the Grameen bank requires also
1http://www.grameen-info.org/bank/GBGlance.htm.
2See Ghatak and Guinnane (1999) and Morduch (1999) for surveys. The book written by ArmendÆriz
de Aghion and Morduch (2005) also reviews some recent papers that focus on issues diﬀerent from joint
liability such as dynamic incentives, competition, the use of collateral, etc.
3We use she for the lender and he for a staﬀ member (or a supervisor) or a borrower.
4For instance, Angolan oﬃcials are accused of embezzling 10 percent of the country￿s GDP during the
last ￿ve years. (Fantaye, 2004, p.173).
5At the time of April 2005, the Grameen bank has 4.48 million borrowers and 1,456 branches.
It works in 51,687 villages and the number of its staﬀ is 13,492. (http://www.grameen-
info.org/bank/GBGlance.htm). The hierarchy is composed of head oﬃce, zonal oﬃce, area oﬃce, branch
oﬃce, center, group, member (Bornstein, 1997 p. 176).
1understanding how its lending contracts successfully solve (or mitigate) agency problems
inherent in a hierarchy. Our paper addresses the question of how an organization that
manages so much money in a corrupt society can remain honest.6
Since most borrowers of micro￿nancing programs in poor countries are illiterate7 and
means of transportation are primitive, they get informed about the conditions of the loan
exclusively through the bank staﬀ member who visits their villages to collect repayments
and to monitor their behavior (regarding how the loan is invested and whether they
undertake adequate eﬀort). This creates signi￿cant scope for the member￿s misconduct,8
and for embezzlement in particular, as documented by Bornstein (1996)9 and Mknelly
and Kevane (2002). For instance, according to Mknelly and Kevane (2002), room for
embezzlement arises because illiterate borrowers cannot maintain their account books.10
Furthermore, contract enforcement problems related to limited liability exist not only at
the level of borrowers but also at the level of staﬀ.
In this paper, we study the optimal lending contract and the optimal supervisory
contract when a staﬀ member can embezzle repayments by misrepresenting the realized
state when a loan contract speci￿es state-contingent repayments. To focus on the staﬀ￿s
i n c e n t i v ep r o b l e m ,w ea s s u m ea w a ya n ya d v e r s es e l e c t i o no rm o r a lh a z a r da tt h el e v e l
of borrower(s). Therefore, our approach is complementary to the approach taken by the
existing literature which focuses on borrowers￿ incentive problems and allows us to explain
two main features of the lending contracts used by the Grameen bank, rigid repayment
schedules and joint liability, as optimal responses to bank staﬀ￿s agency problem. Con-
trary to the ￿ndings of the most papers on group lending that show the optimality of
stage-contingent repayments, the lending contracts of the Grameen bank specify a rigid
repayment schedule which does not depend on the realization of the state; almost imme-
diately after receiving a loan, a borrower has to start to pay back his weekly repayment
6An employee of the Grameen bank says ￿Every other organization in Bangladesh is full of corruption.
Here, you can be an honest person and it￿s possible to remain so.￿ (Bornstein 1997, p. 167)
7According to Yunus (1998, p. 24), ￿We have worked with ... women who cannot read and write.....￿
8Bazoberry (2001, p.13) describes six unauthorized activities that staﬀ members of some micro￿nance
organizations in Bolivia engaged in such as creation of ￿ghost￿ loans to hide the fact that goals are not
met and utilization of inactive saving accounts to pay for outstanding debts etc.
9Bornstein writes about the embezzlement in the early period of the Grameen bank (pp. 169-174).
10For this reason, staﬀ often take the responsibility of maintaining account books. However, when the
authors investigated a staﬀ member￿s accounting book, they found ￿... the account book had no entry for
the group fund. There was no carryover from one cycle to the next, and no entries in the log of deposits
and withdrawals￿(p. 2028).
2which is ￿xed for the whole period of the lending contract.11
We consider a simple model of hierarchy: there are a lender, a supervisor (i.e. a bank
staﬀ member) and borrower(s). The supervisor has the task to check the success or fail-
ure of the project(s) undertaken by the borrower(s) and to collect the repayment(s). The
lender can use either a rigid lending contract in which the borrower makes the same pay-
ment regardless of the realization of the state, or any discretionary contract in which the
repayment depends on the realization of the state. If the lender uses the latter, the super-
visor has some discretion in that when a project succeeded, he can report that the project
failed and embezzle the diﬀerence between the payment upon success and the payment
upon failure. The lender can use incentive pays and/or audit to induce the supervisor
to behave well. We assume that, when a cheating supervisor is discovered, the lender
can recover the original payment made by the borrower and punish the supervisor by not
paying him his salary but cannot impose any further ￿ne because of limited liability.12
As is usual in the literature on micro￿nance13, the lender is assumed to maximize the
borrower(s)￿ payoﬀ subject to the break-even constraint. We assume that a borrower￿s
marginal cost of paying back one unit of money is higher when his project fails than when
it succeeds. Therefore, in the benchmark of a honest supervisor, it is optimal for the bank
to provide insurance to the borrower by recovering all ￿nancing cost through a repayment
upon success.
In section 3, we consider the case of a single borrower and study the optimal lending
contract and the optimal supervisory contract. Individual lending programs are often
used by micro￿nance programs14 and our single borrower case clari￿es the trade-oﬀ be-
tween the optimal rigid lending contract and the optimal discretionary one. We start by
characterizing the optimal supervisory contract for a given discretionary lending contract.
It turns out that it is optimal to use either incentive pays only or audit only. We prove
that the optimal lending contract is either a rigid contract or a discretionary contract. In
the former case, the supervisor has no discretion and neither bonus nor audit is necessary,
while using only audit is optimal in the latter case. The optimal contract is rigid when the
audit cost is larger than the borrower￿s burden of respecting the ￿xed repayment schedule
11Yunus (1998, p.110) describes the repayment mechanism of the Grameen bank as: (i) one year loan
(ii) equal weekly installments (iii) repayment starts one week after the loan etc.
12If a large ￿ne can be imposed, the lender can eliminate the supervisor￿s embezzlement incentive at
almost zero cost.
13For instances, see ArmendÆriz de Aghion (1999), Ghatak (1999, 2000), Rai and Sj￿str￿m (2004) etc.
14According to the Microbanking Bulletin (2002), 73 over 147 best micro￿nance programs surveyed
make loans to individuals.
3when his project fails. In other words, the optimal contract is rigid when the audit cost
is larger than the gain from providing insurance for the borrower.
In section 4, we consider the case of two borrowers and derive the optimal lending
contract and the optimal supervisory contract both with and without joint liability. Note
￿rst that in our model joint liability does not aﬀect the net present value (NPV) of
the project when the supervisor is honest and hence there is no particular reason to
adopt it in the absence of the supervisor￿s agency problem. We ￿nd that joint liability
strictly increases the NPV both under the optimal rigid contract and under the optimal
discretionary contract. Joint liability can thus be regarded as an optimal response to
the embezzlement problem. For instance, if the auditing cost is suﬃciently high that a
rigid contract is optimal, then joint liability reduces the borrowers￿ burden of respecting
a rigid repayment schedule by providing them with partial insurance: although the total
repayment does not depend on the realized state in a rigid contract, some partial insurance
can be provided in the state in which only one borrower￿s project succeeds by increasing his
repayment and reducing the other￿s repayment. However, we show that if the borrowers
can sign a side-contract for mutual insurance, the outcome of the optimal rigid contract
under joint liability can be achieved also under individual liability.
Agency problems in hierarchies have been a major theme of research in economics.
For instances, Williamson (1967) and Calvo and Wellisz (1978) study when and how loss
of control in a hierarchy limits the size of ￿rm. Our paper is more closely related to the
literature on collusion between a supervisor and an agent in the mechanism design theory
(Tirole 1986, Laﬀont and Tirole 1991, Kofman and LawarrØe 1993 and Faure-Grimaud,
Laﬀont and Martimort 2003). In the literature, they derive the optimal collusion-proof
contract when the supervisor can manipulate the information he reports to the principal
about the agent￿s type in exchange for a bribe. We do not consider the collusion but
focus on the supervisor￿s incentive to manipulate the information he reports to the lender
regarding the realized return of the project(s).15
Although our paper is related to the literature on costly state veri￿cation (Townsend
1979, Diamond 1984, Gale and Hellwig 1985) in that the lender can conduct audit to verify
the realized return, to our knowledge it is the ￿rst paper that considers a hierarchy in the
framework of costly state veri￿cation and tackles the supervisor￿s incentive to embezzle
borrowers￿ repayments. Another diﬀerence is that while the previous literature assumes
that the borrower cannot repay the loan for some states and derive the optimality of a
state-contingent repayment contract such as a debt contract, we assume that the borrower
15Note that in section 4.4, we consider side-contracting between borrowers.
4is able to repay the loan even when the project fails,16 which is consistent with the 99% of
repayment rate in the Grameen bank, and focus on the trade-oﬀ be t w e e nar i g i dr e p a y m e n t
schedule and a state-contingent one.
In the micro￿nance literature, only a few papers (Conning, 1999 and Aubert, Janvry
and Sadoulet 2005) consider a hierarchy.17 For instance, Conning (1999) studies both
a borrower￿s incentive to divert the fund and a staﬀ member￿s incentive to monitor the
former￿s misbehavior.18 However, he does not study the staﬀ￿s incentive to embezzle
repayments since he assumes that the realized return is common knowledge as most papers
on micro￿nance do. Furthermore, he considers only one instrument (i.e. incentive pay) to
aﬀect the staﬀ member￿s incentive while we consider two instruments: incentive pay and
audit. In ArmendÆriz de Aghion (1999), ArmendÆriz de Aghion and Gollier (2000), Rai
and Sj￿str￿m (2004), the realized return of a borrower￿s project is his private information.
However, none of them consider a hierarchy. For instance, Rai and Sj￿str￿m (2004)
study the eﬃcient lending contracts that induce the borrowers to truthfully report their
information about the realized returns and show that, for instance, in the absence of
the collusion between the borrowers, the outcome of the ￿rst-best contract (which is a
debt contract and hence state-dependent) can be implemented through a cross-reporting
mechanism when they share information about the returns.19 By contrast, we consider the
eﬃcient lending contracts that induce the supervisor to truthfully report his information
about the realized returns and derive the condition under which a state-independent
contract is optimal. Our results suggest that increasing staﬀ￿s discretion to enable them
to use more local information for borrowers￿ bene￿t, as is suggested by cross-reporting,
can involve the cost of increasing the scope for their misconduct and thereby can back￿re.
Section 2 presents the model for the case of a single borrower and section 3 analyzes
this case. Section 4 analyzes the case of two borrowers. Section 5 discusses our results and
section 6 concludes. All the proofs that are not presented in the main text are gathered
in Appendix.
16This assumption is justi￿ed given the small size of the loans in micro￿nance programs.
17See also chapter 10 of ArmendÆriz de Aghion and Morduch (2005).
18Aubert, Janvry and Sadoulet (2005) study the con￿ict between a not-for pro￿tm i c r o ￿nance orga-
nization and its staﬀ member in terms of the incentive to reach poor borrowers instead of less poor.
However, they also assume the state-contingent lending contract.
19Laﬀont and Rey (2003) also show the optimality of cross-reporting in the absence of collusion in
terms of inducing eﬀort.
52B a s i c m o d e l
We consider a hierarchy composed of a lender, a supervisor and a borrower. The borrower
borrows one unit of money from the lender and invests it in a project. The lender is risk
neutral and designs the contracts. She is assumed to maximize the borrower￿s payoﬀ
as long as her break-even constraint is satis￿ed. To break even, she needs to recover an
amount ρ (> 1), the opportunity cost of the loan, plus the wage bill paid to the supervisor
and the cost of audit.
Let Y denote the revenue generated by the borrower￿s investment: with probability
p ∈ (0,1), the project succeeds and Y = YS > 0; with probability 1−p, it fails and Y = YF
(= 0). A lending contract, represented by {rS,r F},s p e c i ￿es a repayment contingent on
the state: the borrower should pay rS when Y = YS and rF when Y = YF.I no r d e rt o
focus on the moral hazard of the supervisor, we assume that the borrower always pays ri
back for any state i = S,F. In reality, dynamic incentives not modeled in this paper can
induce a borrower to pay back since he highly values the opportunity to borrow larger
and larger amounts of money in the future.20 Without loss of generality, we require ri to
be non-negative, i = S,F.21
The lender does not ask for any collateral, as it is the case with the Grameen bank.
In the case of failure, in order to generate cash rF, the borrower should reduce his con-
sumption22 (or sell his asset, or borrow money from local money lenders charging usurious
interest rates23). This is costly in the following sense: generating r units of money costs
ψ(r) to the borrower, with ψ(0) = 0, ψ
0(r) > 1 and ψ
00(r) ≥ 0 for any r>0;h e n c e ,
ψ(r) >rfor r>0.L e tU(Yi,r i) denote the borrower￿s utility in state i.W ea s s u m e :
U(Yi,r i)=Yi − ri, if Yi − ri ≥ 0;
U(Yi,r i)=−ψ(ri − Yi) if Yi − ri < 0.
Thus, given a state i = S,F, the borrower￿s marginal utility of one unit of money is 1
20This is a main feature of the Grameen lending. See chapter 5.2 of ArmendÆriz de Aghion and Morduch
(2005) for more details on the dynamic incentives.
21We can obtain our results even though ri can be negative, but considering this case makes the proofs
longer without adding economic insight. In short, even though the constraint rF ≥ 0 binds in our analysis,
one cannot strictly improve the borrowers￿ payoﬀ by allowing rF < 0, as we explain in remark 1 in section
3.
22For instance, Bornstein (1997, p.149) documents the story of a woman who purchased a cow with
the money borrowed from the Grameen bank. Since the cow stopped lactating midway through the year,
she had to cut down on her family￿s eating to pay back the weekly installments.
23Jain and Mansuri (2003) provide evidence of micro￿nance members￿ borrowing money from local
lenders.
6if Yi − ri ≥ 0 while it is larger than 1 if Yi − ri < 0. This decreasing marginal utility
of money makes the borrower risk averse. We say that the borrower is fully insured if
rF =0and rS ≤ YS; then, he makes a payment to the lender only in state S and the
marginal utility from additional money is equal to one regardless of the realized state.
When rS ≤ YS and rF ≥ 0, his expected payoﬀ upon accepting the contract is given by:
p(YS − rS) − (1 − p)ψ(rF). (1)
The supervisor has the task to check and report the state (whether i = S or F)a n d
to collect the borrower￿s repayment rS or rF. A supervisory contract speci￿es a wage for
the supervisor contingent on the state he reports: the wage is wS if he reports i = S and
wF if he reports i = F. Since the means of transportation are primitive, the supervisor
m u s tv i s i tt h eb o r r o w e rt og e tt h er e p a y m e n ta n dw ea s s u m et h a ta sl o n ga sh ev i s i t st h e
borrower, he can costlessly verify the state. Furthermore, we assume that the supervisor is
protected by limited liability and therefore his wage cannot be lower than a certain w ≥ 0
(i.e. min{wS,w F} ≥ w), which is the supervisor￿s reservation utility or the minimum
wage. Limited liability can arise for instance from the supervisor￿s having freedom to
quit.24
We focus on the moral hazard of the supervisor, who can misrepresent the state to the
lender. For instance, when ∆ ≡ rS−rF > 0,b yr e p o r t i n gi = F when i = S the supervisor
can embezzle ∆. Since embezzlement requires visiting the borrower, we assume that the
cost of visiting the borrower is zero for simplicity. The lender can audit the actual payment
made by the borrower at the cost of k(> 0). When cheating is discovered, the lender can
recover ∆ and refuse to pay any wage to the supervisor. However, since the supervisor is
protected by limited liability, we assume that the lender cannot impose any further ￿ne
on him. If she can impose a large ￿ne, it is easy to show that she can eliminate the moral
hazard at almost zero cost: for instance, by conducting an audit with a small probability
ε(> 0) and imposing a large ￿ne if embezzlement is discovered, she can solve the moral
hazard at the cost of εk.H e n c e ,w ef o c u so nt h ec a s eo fz e r o￿ne. A supervisory contract
is represented by {qi,w i} with i = S,F,w h e r eqi represents the probability of audit when
the supervisor reports i. For simplicity, the supervisor is assumed to be risk-neutral.
A grand-contract {ri,w i,q i}i=S,F is composed of a lending contract {rS,r F} and a
supervisory contract {wS,w F,q S,q F}. We assume that the lender makes a take-it-or-
leave-it oﬀer to both the supervisor and the borrower. When the supervisor is hon-
est, {rS =( ρ + w)/p,rF = qF = qS =0 ,w S = wF = w} is the optimal grand-contract pro-
24For instance, Conning (1999) assumes limited liability with w =0 .
7vided that pYS > ρ + w. In particular, it provides the borrower with full insurance since
no repayment is required when the project fails (i.e. rF =0 ).
For expositional facility, we de￿ne two kinds of lending contracts, rigid and discre-
tionary, and two kinds of supervisory contracts, with a carrot and with a stick.
De￿nition: A lending contract is said to be rigid if ∆ =0 . A lending contract is said
to be discretionary if ∆ 6=0 . Given a total cost C of ￿nancing the project, a contract
with rS = C/p and rF =0is called a contract with maximum discretion.
De￿nition: A supervisory contract with (wS − wF)(rS − rF) > 0 and qF = qS =0
is called a supervisory contract with a carrot. A supervisory contract with wS = wF and
qF > 0 or qS > 0 is called a supervisory contract with a stick.
In a rigid lending contract, the supervisor has no discretion since the borrower￿s pay-
ment does not depend on the state of nature. By contrast, the supervisor has some
discretion when ∆ 6=0 ; the amount of discretion is given by |∆|. We show later on (in
lemma 1) that we need to consider only lending contracts with ∆ ≥ 0.G i v e nat o t a lc o s t
C of ￿nancing the project, a contract with rS = C/p and rF =0gives the maximum
discretion to the supervisor while providing full insurance for the borrower. When ∆ > 0,
there are two diﬀerent ways to induce the supervisor not to embezzle ∆. If the lender does
not use audit (qF = qS =0 ), she must award an incentive pay: wS must be (suﬃciently)
larger than wF. If no incentive pay is used, audit must be used frequently enough. In the
former case the lender uses a carrot (i.e. the incentive pay), while, in the latter case, she
uses a stick in that if the embezzlement is detected, the supervisor loses his wage and the
stolen repayment is recovered by the lender.
In section 3 in which we consider the case of one borrower, we ￿rst study the optimal
supervisory contract given {rS,r F} and then derive the optimal lending contract by com-
paring the optimal rigid contract with the optimal discretionary contract. Since we are
mainly interested in this comparative static, we make the following assumption, in which
∆max denotes the largest solution to the equation
ρ + w +( 1− p)
∆
∆ + w
k = p∆ (2)
A1: YS is large enough such that the net present value (NPV) of the project (i.e., the
borrower￿s expected utility) is positive at the equilibrium: pYS > ρ+w+(1−p)min{ψ(ρ+
w) − ρ − w,k ∆max
∆max+w}.
8For instance, when the supervisor is honest, the project￿s NPV is positive if and only
if pYS−ρ−w > 0.A 1m e a n st h a tpYS is suﬃciently larger than ρ+w such that the NPV
is positive even in the presence of the cost generated by the supervisor￿s moral hazard.
This allows us to neglect the borrower￿s participation constraint.
3 Single borrower case
In this section, we derive the optimal grand-contract in the case of a single borrower.
From the revelation principle, there is no loss of generality in restricting our attention to
direct revelation mechanisms25 that induce the supervisor to report the true state to the
lender. Therefore, a grand-contract should satisfy the following incentive constraints to
induce the supervisor to report truthfully the state of the world:
(ICSF) wS ≥ (1 − qF)(rS − rF + wF);
(ICFS) wF ≥ (1 − qS)(rF − rS + wS).
A grand-contract must also satisfy the lender￿s break-even constraint given by:
(BE) prS +( 1− p)rF ≥ ρ + pwS +( 1− p)wF +[ pqS +( 1− p)qF]k, (3)
where the right hand side represents the total ￿nancing cost that the lender needs to
recover. The lender￿s optimization problem, denoted by (LS),26 is de￿ned as follows:
max
{ri,wi,qi}i=S,F
p(YS − rS) − (1 − p)ψ(rF)
subject to
(BE), (ICSF), (ICFS), ri ≥ 0, wi ≥ w for i = S,F. (4)
The following useful lemma (i) proves an important property of the borrower￿s utility
function which is repeatedly used in our paper and (ii) shows that we can focus on
contracts such that rS ≥ rF.
Lemma 1 When there is a single borrower,
(i) Suppose that the lending contracts {rS,r F} and {r0
S,r0
F} have the same expected pay-
ment and rF >r 0
F ≥ 0. Then the borrower prefers {r0
S,r 0
F} to {rS,r F}.
(ii) The optimal lending contract is such that ∆ ≥ 0.
25A c c o r d i n gt oL a ﬀont and Martimort (2002, section 3.6), the revelation principle holds when the
principal can commit to audit mechanisms as in our case.
26The large L means the ￿lender￿ and the superscript S means a ￿single￿ borrower.
9Proof. (i) If pr0
S +( 1− p)r0
F = prS +( 1− p)rF ≡ re,t h e np(YS − r0
S) − (1 − p)ψ(r0
F)=
pYS − re +( 1− p)(r0
F − ψ(r0
F)). This function of r0
F is equal to (1) at r0
F = rF and is
decreasing with respect to r0
F.
(ii) Suppose that a grand contract G = {rS,r F,w S,w F,q S,q F} satis￿es (4) and is such






F} which satis￿es (4) and increases
the borrower￿s payoﬀ with respect to G. Precisely, let r0
S = r0
F = prS +( 1− p)rF and
w0
S = w0
F = w, q0
S = q0
F =0 .T h e n ,( a )G0 satis￿es (ICSF) and (ICFS);( b )t h e￿nancing
cost with G0 is equal to ρ + w, the minimum feasible cost: therefore, it cannot be larger
than the cost under G; (c) the borrower￿s expected payment (the left hand side of (BE))
with G0 is the same as with G.H e n c e ,G0 satis￿es (4) and the borrower￿s expected utility
is higher with G0 by lemma 1(i) since rF <r 0
F.
The intuition for lemma 1(i) is that although the expected payment is the same, the
b o r r o w e rp a y sl e s si ns t a t eF with {r0
S,r0
F} than with {rS,r F}; thus, with the former
contract he bears a smaller cost of reducing consumption when his project fails. Lemma
1(ii) relies on lemma 1(i) to show that we can restrict our attention to lending contracts
with ∆ ≥ 0.P r e c i s e l y ,i tp r o v e st h a ti frS <r F, then increasing the payment in state S
and decreasing the payment in state F without modifying the expected payment has the
eﬀect of relaxing the incentive constraints (because the room for embezzlement is reduced)
and increasing the borrower￿s expected utility.
When ∆ ≥ 0 holds, the supervisor has no incentive to misrepresent the state from F
to S in the absence of any incentive pay or audit. Accordingly, we consider the relaxed
problem in which (ICFS) is neglected; but we prove that (ICFS) is satis￿ed in the solution
of this relaxed problem. We observe that in the relaxed problem it is optimal to set qS =0
in order to minimize the ￿nancing cost. For notational simplicity, in the rest of this section
we let q ≡ qF.
We now solve (LS) in two steps. First, given a lending contract {rS,r F},w e￿nd the
optimal supervisory contract {wS,w F,q} that minimizes the cost of ￿nancing the project,
ρ+pwS +(1−p)wF +(1−p)qk, subject to (ICSF), wS ≥ w and wF ≥ w;i ti si m p o r t a n t
to notice that {rS,r F} aﬀects (ICSF) only through ∆ ≥ 0. Second, we maximize the
borrower￿s expected utility with respect to (rS,r F) subject to (BE).27
27This methodology is similar to the one followed in a standard model of moral hazard in which (i) given
an eﬀort level to implement, one ￿nds the incentive scheme which minimizes the cost of implementing
that eﬀort and (ii) one ￿nds the optimal eﬀort.
103.1 The optimal supervisory contract given ∆
In this subsection we ￿nd the optimal supervisory contract given a lending contract (i.e.
given ∆ ≥ 0) by solving the following problem, denoted by (SS):28
min
wS,wF,q ρ + pwS +( 1− p)wF +( 1− p)qk
subject to
(ICSF), wS ≥ w and wF ≥ w.
A ￿rst step is given by a simple lemma:
Lemma 2 When there is a single borrower, the solution to (SS) for a given ∆ ≥ 0 is
such that
(i) wF = w;
(ii) if ∆ =0 ,t h e nwS = w and q =0 ;
(iii) if ∆ > 0,t h e n(ICSF) binds and q ≤ q(∆) ≡ ∆/(∆ + w);
(iv) (ICFS) is satis￿ed.
Proof. (i) Reducing wF improves the objective function and relaxes (ICSF). Therefore
wF is equal to w, the smallest feasible value.
(ii) Since the supervisor has no discretion (∆ =0 ) , there is no need to use incentive pay
or audit.
(iii) Suppose that ∆ > 0 and (ICSF) is slack. Then it is optimal to set wS = w and q =0 ,
but a contradiction arises because (ICSF) is violated, given ∆ > 0.I f q>∆/(∆ + w),
then the right hand side of (ICSF) is smaller than w and (ICSF) is slack.
(iv) If (ICSF) is slack, then wS = w and (ICFS) reduces to w ≥− ∆+w.I f(ICSF) binds,
then (ICFS) is w ≥− ∆ +( 1− q)(∆ + w),e q u i v a l e n tt oqw ≥− q∆.
In what follows we consider the case of ∆ > 0.S i n c e (ICSF) binds, we ￿nd wS =
(1−q)(∆+w). The objective function after replacing wS with (1−q)(∆+w) in (SS) is
ρ + p(1 − q)(∆ + w)+( 1− p)w +( 1− p)qk
We need to minimize this function with respect to q,f o rq ∈ [0,q(∆)]. Since the function
is linear in q, the optimum is easily found as follows. Let ∆ ≡ (1 − p)k/p − w. Then,
q =0is optimal if ∆ ≤ ∆ while q = q(∆) is optimal if ∆ > ∆. The following proposition
summarizes these results by characterizing the optimal supervisory contract as a function
of ∆ ≥ 0 and gives the associated ￿nancing cost.
28The large S means a ￿supervisory contract￿.
11Proposition 1 When there is a single borrower, given a lending contract with ∆ ≥ 0,t h e
optimal supervisory contract is characterized as follows. There exists ∆ ≡ (1−p)k/p−w
such that




, q =0and wS = w + ∆, wF = w;t h e
￿nancing cost is ρ + p∆ + w;




, q = q(∆) and wS = wF = w;t h e￿nancing cost
is ρ + w +( 1− p)q(∆)k.
We now provide an intuitive explanation of the optimal supervisory contract by con-
sidering the case in which ∆ > 0.N o t e￿rst that because the total ￿nancing cost in the
objective function and (ICSF) are linear with respect to q,t h eo p t i m a lq is either zero
(i.e. no audit) or q(∆), which is the minimal q that satis￿es (ICSF) at the minimum
wage wS = wF = w.W i t h q =0 , the lender must give a carrot (wS − wF)e q u a lt o
the amount of discretion (∆) to satisfy (ICSF);w h e nq = q(∆),i n s t e a d ,t h ec o n t r a c t
induces truthtelling by using only stick since wS = wF = w. In order to see which method
between the carrot and the stick performs better, we compare the extra ￿nancing cost
generated by the supervisor￿s moral hazard with respect to the cost in the absence of
the moral hazard. Without the moral hazard, the ￿nancing cost is simply ρ + w.T h e
extra cost under the carrot contract is p∆ while the extra cost under the stick contract is
(1 − p)q(∆)k =( 1− p)∆k/(∆ + w).T h et w oa r et h es a m ew h e n∆ = ∆, but the former
increases faster than the latter as ∆ ≥ ∆ increases. Hence, using only an incentive pay is
optimal for small discretion (∆ ≤ ∆) while using only audit is optimal for large discretion
(∆ ≥ ∆). For expositional facility, we say that a supervisory contract belongs to the stick








.N o t e
however that in the special case of ∆ =0 , lemma 2(ii) says that the lender needs neither
carrot nor stick.
3.2 The optimal lending contract
We now ￿nd the optimal lending contract by maximizing the borrower￿s payoﬀ subject to
the lender￿s break-even constraint (BE). Given a lending contract {rS,r F},p r o p o s i t i o n
1i d e n t i ￿es the minimum ￿nancing cost that determines the right hand side of (BE).
Furthermore, since any increase in rS or rF reduces the borrower￿s payoﬀ, (BE) must
bind in the optimum. We ￿rst ￿nd the optimal lending contract conditional on the carrot
or the stick regime and then derive the optimal contract.




. Then, from the
binding (BE),w eo b t a i n
rF = ρ + w.
Since rF is equal to ρ + w regardless of the value of ∆, the objective of (LS) is given by
p(YS − ρ − w − ∆) − (1 − p)ψ(ρ + w). (5)
It is clear that ∆ > 0 increases the ￿nancing cost (with respect to ∆ =0 ) without aﬀecting
rF; hence, in the carrot regime a rigid contract (a contract with ∆ =0 ) is optimal. This
implies rS = rF = ρ + w.




. Now the binding
(BE) is given by
rF = ρ + w +( 1− p)q(∆)k − p∆(≡ r
stick
F (∆)).( 6 )




is feasible if and
only if rstick
F (∆) ≥ 0. I ti se a s yt ov e r i f yt h a trstick
F (∆max)=0 ,w h e r e∆max is de￿ned
through (2), and that rstick

















,∆max]. The lender chooses ∆ in this





F (∆) − ∆
⁄
− (1 − p)ψ[r
stick
F (∆)]. (7)
Let ∆∗S denote the maximizer of (7). In order to have an idea of what determines ∆∗S,
notice from (6) that an increase in ∆ has two opposing eﬀects on rstick
F . On the one hand,
rstick
F is reduced because of the term −p∆ which shifts the borrower￿s payment from state
F to state S without changing his expected payment; this increases his payoﬀ by providing
insurance (see lemma 1). On the other hand, increasing ∆ raises the auditing cost because,
for a given q<1, it gives the supervisor a higher incentive to embezzle and a larger q is
needed to satisfy (ICSF) with wS = w.T h i si n c r e a s e srstick
F through the term (1−p)q(∆)k
and reduces the borrower￿s payoﬀ. This trade-oﬀ makes it diﬃcult to ￿nd the exact value
of ∆∗S,a si tr e s u l t sf r o mf(∆) ≡− p[
drstick
F (∆)





d∆ ,t h e￿rst
order derivative of (7).
The next proposition characterizes the optimal grand contract; after summarizing the
general ￿nding in (i), it gives more detailed results by considering speci￿c cases in (ii) and
13(iii). Since, without further assumption, it is impossible to derive ∆∗S and to perform the
comparison between the optimal rigid contract and the optimal discretionary contract,
we need to consider the speci￿c cases in which ψ is linear or w =0 .
Proposition 2 When there is a single borrower, under A1,
(i) The optimal grand contract is the best one between the two following ones:
a. a rigid lending contract {rS = rF = ρ + w} with {wS = wF = w,q=0 }
b. a lending contract
'





wS = wF = w,q= q(∆∗S)
“
,
which is discretionary if ∆∗S > 0.
(ii) When ψ(r)=θr with θ > 1,w e￿nd that ∆∗S ∈
'
max{0,∆},∆max“
.T h e r i g i d
lending contract is optimal if and only if
kq(∆
max) ≥ ψ(ρ + w) − ρ − w (8)
Otherwise, the discretionary contract in (i)b with ∆∗S = ∆max is optimal.
(iii) When w =0 ,w e￿nd ∆∗S = ∆max =[ ρ +( 1− p)k]/p and q(∆)=1 .T h u s ,t h er i g i d
contract is optimal if and only if k ≥ ψ(ρ) − ρ, otherwise the discretionary contract in
(i)b with ∆∗S = ∆max and q =1is optimal.
Suppose that ψ(r)=θr for some θ > 1. Then, since rstick
F is concave in ∆,( 7 )i sc o n v e x




or to ∆max.29 However, if ∆∗S = ∆,t h e n
the rigid lending contract in Proposition 2(i)a is optimal because we already know that
∆ =0is strictly better than ∆ = ∆. Therefore, the rigid contract is optimal if and only
if (5) evaluated at ∆ =0is larger than (7) evaluated at ∆ = ∆max, a condition which is
equivalent to (8).
Proposition 2(ii) establishes that when ψ is linear, the optimal lending contract is
either a rigid contract or a contract with maximum discretion and stick. In the former
case, the lender needs neither carrot nor stick and therefore the ￿nancing costs are equal to
ρ+w, the lowest feasible level. However, rF = ρ+w > 0 implies that the borrower is badly
insured. The contract with maximum discretion instead provides full insurance because it
speci￿es rS = ∆max(> 0) and rF =0 . However, the possibility of embezzlement requires
the lender to conduct audit with probability q(∆max) ∈ (0,1) whenever the supervisor
reports that the project failed and this increases the borrower￿s expected payment to
29We obtain the corner solutions since the marginal gain in terms of insurnace from increasing ∆ is
constant because of the linear ψ(r) while the marginal cost in terms of audit cost decreases because of
concave ﬂ q(∆).
14ρ + w +( 1− p)kq(∆max). Therefore, it is obvious that the optimal lending contract is
rigid if and only if the expected audit cost (1 − p)kq(∆max) is larger than the expected
gain (1 − p)[ψ(ρ + w) − ρ − w] from full insurance, as stated by (8).30
Another setting in which a clear result can be obtained is the one with w =0 ; then,
we have ∆ > 0 and q(∆)=1for any ∆ ≥ ∆. I nt h i sc a s e ,s i n c ea ni n c r e a s eo f∆ in
[∆,∆max] does not increase the audit cost but reduces rstick
F (and increases rS) without
modifying the borrower￿s expected payment, it is clear that ∆∗S = ∆max, which is equal
to [ρ +( 1− p)k]/p. Then, the same argument given above about the trade-oﬀ between
insurance and audit cost determines the optimum between the rigid contract and the
contract with maximum discretion.
Remark 1 The characterization of the optimal contract in proposition 2 applies even if
rF can be negative. First, the optimal rigid contract is obviously not aﬀected. Second,
concerning the optimal discretionary contract, setting rF < 0 does not improve insurance
provision with respect to rF =0but weakly increases the audit cost kq(∆) since ∆ must
be larger than ∆max.
4 Group lending
Suppose now that there are two borrowers living in the same village. Each borrower
￿nances a project with one unit of money borrowed from the lender and a supervisor
monitors both of them. For simplicity, we assume that the revenue of each project is
identically and independently distributed. Let p ∈ (0,1) denote the probability of success
of a project. We assume that both borrowers and the supervisor observe whether each
project succeeds or fails. We distinguish two cases depending on whether there is joint
liability or individual liability between the two borrowers.
Under individual liability, the lender signs an individual lending contract with each
borrower which takes the same form {rS,r F} as before. However, the supervisory con-
tract is diﬀerent since the supervisor now monitors two borrowers. Let wn represent the
supervisor￿s wage and qn the probability of conducting an audit when he reports that n
number of projects succeeded, with n ∈ {0,1,2}. Therefore, a supervisory contract is
given by {wn,q n, for n =0 ,1,2}; the minimum wage constraint requires wn ≥ w for each
n. Since both borrowers live in the same village, the cost of audit does not depend on
30Actually, proposition 2(ii) holds as long as (7) is convex in ∆, which occurs even though ψ is not
linear but ψ
00 is close to 0.
15whether the lender audits the payment of one borrower or those of both borrowers31 and
is equal to k>0.
Introducing joint liability aﬀects the form of the lending contract but not the form
of the supervisory contract. Under joint liability, the lender signs a lending contract
with the group of the two borrowers which takes the form {rSS,r SF,r FS,r FF}32 where,
for instance, rSF represents the payment that a borrower whose project succeeded has
to make when the other￿s project failed. Without loss of generality, we assume that rij
cannot be negative for i,j = S,F.33
We call a lending contract with joint liability a group lending contract.N o t e￿rst that
the set of lending contracts under individual liability can be seen as the (strict) subset of
the group lending contracts that satisfy rSS = rSF and rFS = rFF. Observe also that if
the supervisor is honest, the ￿rst-best outcome can be achieved under individual liability
by choosing prS = ρ + w and rF =0 . Therefore, we have two observations:
Observation 1: The set of lending contracts under individual liability is a strict
subset of the set of group lending contracts.
Observation 2: If the supervisor is honest, the ￿rst-best outcome can be achieved
without joint liability.
We de￿ne a rigid or a discretionary group lending contract:
De￿nition: A group lending contract is rigid if 2rSS = rSF + rFS =2 rFF;o t h e r w i s e ,
it is discretionary.
In this section we make the following assumption, where ∆max


























31The main cost of audit is the cost of visiting the village and the marginal cost of visiting one more
borrower in the same village is negligeable.
32In the literature, joint liability has often been formalized as in our paper.
33As in the case of the single borrower, we can obtain our results even though rij can be negative but
considering this possibility makes the proofs much longer. Even though the constraint rFF ≥ 0 binds
in our analysis, one cannot strictly improve the borrowers￿ payoﬀ by allowing for rFF < 0 for reasons
similar to those explained in remark 1 in section 3.
16A1￿(i) is similar to A1 and implies that the NPV of the project is positive at the equi-
librium. A1￿(ii) simpli￿es our analysis of the optimal lending contract under joint liability
in that rFS =0becomes optimal; it is introduced since otherwise the characterization
of the optimal supervisory and lending contracts under joint liability is technically more
demanding without generating any new insight. Note that both A1￿(i) and A1￿(ii) are
equivalent to requiring that YS be large enough.
Consider the case of joint liability. As we have argued in section 3, by the revelation
principle there is no loss of generality in restricting our attention to direct revelation
mechanisms that induce the supervisor to report the true state. Therefore, the following
incentive constraints should be satis￿ed:
(ICnb n) wn ≥ (1 − qb n)[R(n) − R(b n)+wb n] for (n,b n) ∈ {0,1,2}
2 , (10)
where R(2) ≡ 2rSS, R(1) ≡ rSF + rFS, R(0) ≡ 2rFF. The lender￿s break-even constraint
is now
(BE)2 p
2rSS +2 p(1 − p)(rSF + rFS)+2 ( 1− p)
2rFF
≥ 2ρ + p
2(w2 + kq2)+2 p(1 − p)(w1 + kq1)+( 1− p)
2(w0 + kq0)
and the lender￿s program under joint liability, denoted by
¡
LJ¢
,i sd e ￿ned as follows:
max
rSS,r SF,r FS,r FF
wn,q n for n=0,1,2
p
2 (2YS − 2rSS)+2 p(1 − p)(YS − rSF − ψ(rFS)) − (1 − p)
22ψ(rFF)
subject to
(BE), (10), rij ≥ 0 for i,j = S,F, wn ≥ w for n =0 ,1,2.
Note that in the objective function in (LJ) we assume rSF ≤ YS and rSS ≤ YS,w h i c hi n
the proof of proposition 4 we verify to be satis￿ed under A1￿.
Our next lemma presents one important eﬀect of joint liability:
Lemma 3 When there are two borrowers, under joint liability, it is optimal to choose
rFS =0and rSF = R(1) if YS is suﬃciently large.
Proof. Let R(1) be given, which means that rSF + rFS is given. We prove that if YS is
suﬃciently large, then it is optimal to setrFS =0and thus rSF = R(1).S i n c e R(1) is
given, (rSF,r FS) does not aﬀect (10) but aﬀects the borrowers￿ payoﬀ only through the
term
2p(1 − p)[YS − rSF − ψ(rFS)] = 2p(1 − p)[YS − R(1) + rFS − ψ(rFS)] (11)
17where the equality comes from rSF = R(1)− rFS. In writing (11), we implicitly assumed
that rSF ≤ YS. As long as this condition holds, maximizing (11) with respect to rFS tells
us that any rFS > 0 is dominated by rFS =0since ψ
0(r) > 1 for any r>0.W ep r o v e
in proposition 4 that the condition rSF ≤ YS is satis￿ed in the optimal lending contract
given that A1￿(ii) holds.34
Lemma 3 says that when one borrower is successful and the other is not, it is optimal
that the unsuccessful borrower pays nothing (rFS =0 ) and the lender￿s revenue comes only
from the successful borrower (rSF = R(1)). The reason is that letting the unsuccessful
borrower pay a positive amount requires him to reduce his consumption, which is more
costly for borrowers than simply using the money generated by the successful project.
Therefore, joint liability provides borrowers with insurance in the states of the world
where only one project is successful. Clearly, this approach is viable only if the successful
borrower has enough money to pay R(1); we show later on that R(1) ≤ YS holds in the
optimal contract under A1￿.
Let ∆1 ≡ rSF +rFS−2rFF and ∆2 ≡ 2rSS −rSF −rFS. For the case of one borrower,
lemma 1(ii) shows that the optimal lending contract is such that ∆ ≥ 0.F o r t h e t i m e
being we analyze the setting with two borrowers by focusing on the case in which ∆1 ≥ 0
and ∆2 ≥ 0. After deriving the optimal grand contract when ∆1 ≥ 0 and ∆2 ≥ 0,w e
prove that relaxing these restrictions on (∆1,∆2) does not increase the borrowers￿ payoﬀ
(in lemma 8).
The program with individual liability, denoted by
¡
LI¢




rS replaces rSS and rSF and rF replaces rFF and rFS (and therefore we have ∆1 = ∆2).
Notice that under individual liability the proof of lemma 1(ii) applies and therefore we




,w h e n∆1 ≥ 0 and ∆2 ≥ 0, it is easy to see that the supervisor has no incentive
to report a state b n larger than the true state n in the absence of any incentive pay or
audit. Therefore, we consider a relaxed problem
¡
LrJ¢
in which the upward incentive




(IC21) w2 ≥ (1 − q1)(∆2 + w1);
(IC20) w2 ≥ (1 − q0)(∆2 + ∆1 + w0);
(IC10) w1 ≥ (1 − q0)(∆1 + w0);
(12)
34Furthermore, if we allow for rFS < 0 then (11) becomes 2p(1 − p)[YS − R(1)] and does not depend
on rFS. Intuitively, in state FS the marginal utility of money for the unsuccessful borrower is 1 when
rFS < 0 and so the precise value of rFS(< 0) is irrelevant, given R(1). However, since rSF = R(1)−rFS,
an e g a t i v erFS makes rSF larger than R(1) and it is more diﬃcult to satisfy rSF ≤ YS.
18(LL) wn ≥ w for n =0 ,1,2. (13)
The next lemma establishes some straightforward properties of (LrJ) and, more im-
portantly, shows that the solution to
¡
LrJ¢
satis￿es (IC02), (IC01), (IC12) even though
we do not know yet the solution. Therefore, the solution to
¡
LrJ¢
is the optimal grand
contract and, with some abuse of notation, we use
¡
LJ¢
to denote the relaxed problem.
Lemma 4 The solution to the relaxed problem
(i) is such that q2 =0and w0 = w;
(ii) satis￿es (IC02), (IC01), (IC12) and therefore it is just the optimal grand contract.
As in the previous section, we perform our analysis in two steps: we ￿rst ￿nd the
optimal supervisory contract given a lending contract and then ￿nd the optimal lending
contract.
4.1 The optimal supervisory contract
In this subsection, we ￿nd the optimal supervisory contract, given a lending contract
{rSS,r SF,r FS,r FF} satisfying (∆1,∆2) ≥ (0,0), by minimizing the right hand side of







2w2 +2 p(1 − p)(w1 + kq1)+( 1− p)
2(w + kq0) (14)
subject to (12) − (13)
We use CJ(∆1,∆2) to represent the value of the objective function in (14) at the optimal
supervisory contract.
Solving (SJ) is not straightforward because the incentive constraints are not linear in
(w2,w 1,q 1,q 0), although they are linear in each single variable. This leads to minimizing
a function which is neither concave nor convex, over a non-convex feasible set. We ￿rst
prove that there exist three regimes for the binding incentive constraints in the solution
to (SJ):
Lemma 5 When there are two borrowers, under joint liability, the optimal supervisory
contract given (∆1,∆2) ≥ (0,0) is such that the binding incentive constraints are either
(IC21)a n d( I C 20), or (IC10)a n d( I C 21), or all the three constraints in (12)
The next lemma shows that by considering the three regimes, ￿ve diﬀerent supervisory
contracts may be optimal for diﬀerent parameter values. The contracts are introduced
below and are denoted by α, β, γ, δ, η; CJ
h(∆1,∆2) represents the value of the objective
function in (14) under contract h = α,β,γ,δ,η.
19￿ α :( q0,q 1)=( 0 ,0), (w0,w 1,w 2)=( w,w+ ∆1,w+ ∆1 + ∆2), CJ
α(∆1,∆2)=
2ρ + w + p(2 − p)∆1 + p2∆2;
￿ β :( q0,q 1)=( ∆1
∆1+w,0), (w0,w 1,w 2)=( w,w,w+ ∆2), CJ
β(∆1,∆2)=2 ρ + w +
(1 − p)2k ∆1
∆1+w + p2∆2;
￿ γ :( q0,q 1)=( ∆1
∆1+w, ∆2∆1
(∆2+w)(∆1+w)), (w0,w 1,w 2)=( w,w,w+w ∆2
∆1+w), CJ
γ(∆1,∆2)=
2ρ + w + p2w ∆2
∆1+w +2 p(1 − p)k ∆2∆1
(∆2+w)(∆1+w) +( 1− p)2k ∆1
∆1+w;
￿ δ :35 q0 = q∗





p(p∆2+(2−p)(∆1+w))−(1−p)2k, q1 = f(q∗
0) with f(q0) ≡
q0∆2




δ (∆1,∆2)=2 ρ +( 1− q∗




￿ η :( q0,q 1)=( ∆2+∆1
∆2+∆1+w, ∆2
∆2+w), (w0,w 1,w 2)=( w,w,w),C J
η (∆1,∆2)=2 ρ + w +
2p(1 − p)k ∆2
∆2+w +( 1− p)2k ∆2+∆1
∆2+∆1+w.
We have:
Lemma 6 When there are two borrowers, under joint liability,
(i) Suppose that ∆1 > 0 and ∆2 > 0.
a. If only (IC21)a n d( I C 20) bind in the optimum of (SJ),t h e nη is the optimal
supervisory contract.
b. If only (IC10)a n d( I C 21) bind in the optimum of (SJ),t h e nβ is the optimal
supervisory contract.
c. If all the constraints in (12) bind in the optimum of (SJ), then the optimal super-
visory contract belongs to {α,δ,γ}.
(ii) If ∆1 =0and/or ∆2 =0 , then the optimal supervisory contract belongs to {α,β,η}.
A consequence of lemma 6 is the following proposition, which characterizes the optimal
supervisory contract for any given lending contract with ∆1 ≥ 0 and ∆2 ≥ 0. The propo-
sition includes the characterization of the optimal supervisory contract under individual
liability as a special case with ∆1 = ∆2 ≥ 0.
Proposition 3 When there are two borrowers, under joint liability, the optimal super-











35This contract is de￿ned if and only if 2p(1−p) ∆2
∆2+∆1+wk<p (p∆2 +(2−p)(∆1 +w))−(1−p)2k<
2p(1 − p)
∆2(∆2+∆1+w)
(∆2+w)2 k; these conditions are equivalent to q∗
0 ∈ (0, ∆1
∆1+w).
20To give an interpretation of each diﬀerent supervisory contract, we consider the simple
case of w =0 ; then, contract η is equivalent to γ. Contract α speci￿es no audit but
intensively uses carrots since w1 − w0 = ∆1 and w2 − w1 = ∆2. Contract γ, by contrast,
gives no incentive pay but intensively uses sticks since the lender conducts audit with
probability one whenever the supervisor reports that at least one project failed. Contract
β uses either carrot or stick depending on the supervisor￿s report in the following sense.
When the supervisor reports n =0 , the lender audits with probability one (q0 =1 )w h i l e
the supervisor receives a carrot w2 − w1 = ∆2 when he reports n =2 . Finally, contract δ
m i x e sc a r r o t sa n ds t i c k sn o to v e rd i ﬀerent states of nature as β, but within the same state
of nature; since ∆1 >w 1 − w0 > 0 and ∆2 >w 2 − w1 > 0, there is a positive probability
of audit both if the supervisor reports n =1a n di fh er e p o r t sn =0 .
4.2 The optimal lending contract under joint liability
In this subsection we ￿nd the optimal lending contract under joint liability by solving
¡
LJ¢
.W h e n∆1 ≥ 0 and ∆2 ≥ 0, the next lemma says that we can restrict our attention
to the set of lending contracts satisfying ∆2 =0 .
Lemma 7 If YS is suﬃciently large, then the best contract within the set of lending con-
tracts satisfying ∆1 ≥ 0 and ∆2 ≥ 0 is such that ∆2 =0 . Thus, the best supervisory
contract is either α or β.
The proof of the lemma basically shows that when ∆1 ≥ 0 and ∆2 > 0, reducing ∆2
while increasing ∆1 and keeping the borrowers￿ expected payment constant does not hurt
borrowers but can relax the incentive constraints in (12).36 Since ∆2 =0implies that
(i) δ is not de￿ned (see footnote 35); (ii) γ and η are equivalent to β, it follows that the
optimal supervisory contract belongs to {α,β}.
In order to solve
¡
LJ¢
,w e￿rst determine CJ(∆1,0) by comparing CJ
α(∆1,0) with
CJ
β(∆1,0). For this purpose, we introduce ﬂ ∆1 ≡
(1−p)2







, contract α is optimal and therefore we are in the carrot regime.




, contract β is optimal and we are in the stick regime.
36As for lemma 3, this argument assumes that YS is larger than R(1). We verify in the proof of
proposition 4 that this condition is satis￿ed.
37Note that ﬂ ∆1 is similar to ﬂ ∆ de￿ned in section 3.1 in that k is multiplied by the probability of the
state in which audit may occur in contract β and is divided by the probability of the states in which
there is no audit.
21We now derive the optimal lending contract while assuming that YS is large enough.
By using rSF =2 rSS = ∆1 +2rFF (rFS =0b yl e m m a3a n d∆2 =0by lemma 7) we can
write the lender￿s program as follows:
max
∆1≥0,rFF≥0
2pYS − p(2 − p)(2rFF + ∆1) − (1 − p)
22ψ(rFF) (15)
subject to
(BE)2 rFF + p(2 − p)∆1 = C
J(∆1,0); (16)
since (BE) binds in the optimum in the case of two borrowers as well.
Consider ￿rst the carrot regime (i.e. ∆1 ∈ [0,max{0, ﬂ ∆1}]). Then, (16) is equivalent
to 2rFF =2 ρ+w. Since increasing ∆1 ends up only increasing the ￿nancing cost without
improving insurance provision, it is optimal to choose ∆1 =0in the carrot regime as in
the case of single borrower.
Consider now the stick regime (i.e. ∆1 ≥ max{0, ﬂ ∆1}). Then (16) is equivalent to

















introduced just before assumption A1￿), it follows that rstick
FF (∆1) ≥ 0 if and only if
∆1 ≤ ∆max











2pYS − p(2 − p)[2r
stick




This maximization problem is similar to the one in section 3.2. Let ∆
∗β
1 denote the





1 ]. Proposition 4 gives the general result and
some clear-cut results under speci￿c assumptions on ψ or w as proposition 2 in section
3.2.
Proposition 4 When there are two borrowers, under A1￿ and joint liability,
(i) the optimal grand contract is the best between the two following ones:
a. A rigid lending contract {2rSS =2 rFF = rSF =2 ρ + w,r FS =0 } with {q0 = q1 =
q2 =0 ,w 0 = w2 = w2 = w} (the supervisory contract is α).
b. A lending contract {2rSS = rSF = ∆
∗β










(ii) When ψ is linear we ￿nd that ∆
∗β
1 is either equal to max{0, ﬂ ∆1} or to ∆max
1 .T h e
rigid contract is optimal if and only if kﬂ q(∆1) ≥ 2[ψ(ρ + 1
2w) − ρ − 1
2w].





p(2−p) and the rigid contract is optimal if
and only if k ≥ 2(ψ(ρ) − ρ).
As in the case of a single borrower, we can determine the exact value of ∆
∗β
1 under
the assumption that ψ is linear or w =0 . In these cases the optimal contract is either
a rigid contract or the contract with maximum discretion in terms of ∆1 (while ∆2 =0
from lemma 7). The former provides insurance only when at least one project succeeds
while the latter provides insurance for all states. However, the latter involves an audit
cost; the audit occurs only when both projects fail (and with probability equal to one if
w =0 ). Therefore, the rigid contract is optimal when the audit cost (1 − p)2kﬂ q(∆
∗β
1 ) is
superior to the gain (1−p)22[ψ(ρ+ 1
2w)−ρ− 1
2w] from providing full insurance for both
borrowers, as proposition 4(ii)-(iii) states.
Although the statement of proposition 4 is about the optimal grand contract, propo-
sition 4 considers only lending contracts such that ∆1 ≥ 0 and ∆2 ≥ 0. The proposition
is correct, nevertheless, since the following lemma shows that there is no loss of generality
in restricting attention to contracts with ∆1 ≥ 0 and ∆2 ≥ 0.38
Lemma 8 When there are two borrowers, under joint liability and A1￿, the optimal lend-
ing contract satis￿es ∆1 ≥ 0 and ∆2 ≥ 0.
4.3 Individual liability
In the case of individual liability, a lending contract is such that rSS = rSF = rS and
rFS = rFF = rF, which implies ∆1 = ∆2 ≡ ∆. In order to have an idea of the eﬀects
of individual liability, notice ￿rst that in the case of joint liability, given rFF ≥ 0 and
∆1 ≥ 0, it is possible to set rFS =0and rSF = R(1) = 2rFF+∆1 (if 2rFF+∆1 ≤ YS)a n d
thereby to provide some insurance to an unsuccessful borrower when the other borrower
has success (lemma 3). Under individual liability, by contrast, rFS =0implies rFF =0
and therefore, for instance, the optimal rigid contract under joint liability described by
Proposition 4(i)a is not feasible. Notice also that while it is always optimal to set ∆2 =0
under joint liability (lemma 7), in the setting of individual liability no similar result holds
because ∆2 =0implies ∆1 =0 .
The optimal supervisory contract under individual liability is a special case of the
optimal supervisory one under joint liability characterized in Proposition 3, after re-
placing ∆1 and ∆2 with ∆.T h e r e f o r e , f o r h = α,β,γ,δ,η,l e tCI
h(∆) ≡ CJ
h(∆,∆)
38The lemma is presented here because its proof is easier to read after reading the analysis of the case
with ∆1 ≥ 0 and ∆2 ≥ 0.
23denote the cost of the supervisory contract h,g i v e n∆.T h e￿rst part of the next lemma





η(∆)} as the minimum ￿nancing cost derived from
the optimal supervisory contract given ∆. The second part of the lemma proves a useful
property of CI.
Lemma 9 (i) When there are two borrowers, under individual liability, contract δ is
never an optimal supervisory contract;
(ii) CI is concave in ∆.
From (LJ) we can write the lender￿s program under individual liability, denoted by
(LI), as follows:
(
max∆≥0,rF≥0 2pYS − 2p(rF + ∆) − 2(1 − p)ψ(rF)
subject to (BE)2 rF +2 p∆ = CI(∆);
(19)
We can express (19) by using (BE) to obtain rF(∆)=
CI(∆)
2 −p∆, which we insert into
the objective function. Furthermore, Lemma 9(ii) implies that there exists a unique ∆ ￿
we represent this value with ∆max
I ￿s u c ht h a trF(∆) ≥ 0 for ∆ ∈ [0,∆max
I ].T h u s ,w en e e d
to solve the program max∆∈[0,∆max
I ] 2pYS − 2p(
CI(∆)
2 − p∆ + ∆) − 2(1 − p)ψ(
CI(∆)
2 − p∆).
In order to tackle this program, it would be useful to know, for given ∆ ∈ [0,∆max
I ],
which contract in {α,β,γ,η} is the optimal supervisory contract. Since comparing the
four contracts is cumbersome, we consider the special case in which ψ is linear. Under
this assumption the objective function is convex and therefore the optimal contract is
either rigid (i.e. ∆ =0 ) or has the maximum discretion, in the sense that rF =0and
rS = ∆max
I . Notice however that without further speci￿cation, it is hard to know the
optimal supervisory contract at ∆ = ∆max
I and hence to determine the value of ∆max
I ,
which is necessary to have a clear-cut result in terms of comparative static. The next
proposition provides a general result under the linear ψ a n dam o r ed e t a i l e dr e s u l tu n d e r
the speci￿cc a s ew i t hw =0 .
Proposition 5 When there are two borrowers, under individual liability, suppose that
A1￿ is satis￿ed and ψ(r)=θr with θ > 1.T h e n
( i )T h eo p t i m a lg r a n dc o n t r a c ti st h eb e s tb e t w e e nt h et w of o l l o w i n go n e s :
a. A rigid lending contract {rS = rF = ρ+1
2w} with {q0 = q1 = q2 =0 ,w 0 = w1 = w2 = w},
b. A discretionary contract with {rS = ∆max
I ,r F =0 }. The rigid contract is optimal
if and only if CI(∆max
I ) − CI(0) ≥ (1 − p){2ψ[1
2CI(0)] − CI(0)},w h e r eCI(0) = 2ρ + w.
24(ii) When w =0and 2ρ ≥ (1−p)(3−p)k, the optimal grand contract is the best between
the two following ones:
a. A rigid lending contract {rS = rF = ρ} with {q0 = q1 = q2 =0 ,w 0 = w1 = w2 =0 }
(the supervisory contract is α).
b. A discretionary contract {rS =[ 2 ρ+(1−p2)k]/2p,rF =0 } with {q0 = q1 =1 ,q 2 =0
w0 = w1 = w2 =0 } (the supervisory contract is γ with ∆ =[ 2 ρ +( 1− p2)k]/2p).T h e
rigid contract is optimal if and only if (1 + p)k ≥ 2(ψ(ρ) − ρ).
The result in Proposition 5(i) is quite consistent with Propositions 2(ii) and 4(ii) and
shows the trade-oﬀ between insurance and the cost to discourage embezzlement. A more
speci￿c result can be obtained if, furthermore, we assume that w =0because then it is
easy to ￿nd the optimal supervisory contract given ∆,a n ds o∆max
I . Indeed, in this case






2ρ +2 p∆ if ∆ ≤
(1−p)2
p(2−p)k
2ρ +( 1− p)2k + p2∆ if
(1−p)2
p(2−p)k ≤ ∆ ≤
2(1−p)
p k
2ρ +( 1− p2)k if
2(1−p)
p k ≤ ∆
(20)





p k if 2ρ < (1 − p)(3 − p)k, while ∆max
I ≥
2(1−p)
p k if 2ρ ≥ (1 − p)(3 − p)k. We assume in the following that the audit cost is
relatively small with respect to the cost of capital and thus 2ρ ≥ (1 − p)(3 − p)k is










The optimal contract under individual liability characterized in Proposition 5(ii) is
very similar to the one in the single-borrower case characterized in Proposition 2(iii). The
only diﬀerence is that under the optimal discretionary contract in Proposition 5(iii)b,
when both borrowers fail, the lender needs to incur the audit cost only once instead of
twice. This is why the condition for the optimal contract to be rigid is more restrictive
in proposition 5(ii) than in proposition 2(iii).




and the optimal grand contract is either the rigid one described in proposition 5(ii)a or
{rS =
2ρ+(1−p)2k





supervisory contract is β with ∆ =
2ρ+(1−p)2k
p(2−p) ). The rigid contract is optimal if and only
if pρ +( 1− p)2k ≥ (1 − p)(2 − p)(ψ(ρ) − ρ).
39For instance, if p =1 /2 the inequality is equivalent to 5
8k ≤ ρ.
254.4 Comparison: joint liability versus individual liability
The following table summarizes the total NPV when there are two borrowers (and ψ is
linear, w =0and 2ρ ≥ (1−p)(3−p)k) under the optimal rigid or discretionary contract40
depending on the form of the liability.
Liability The optimal rigid contract The optimal discretionary contract
Joint V − (1 − p)22(ψ(ρ) − ρ) V − (1 − p)2k
Individual V − [(1 − p)2 + p(1 − p)]2(ψ(ρ) − ρ) V − [(1 − p)2 +2 p(1 − p)]k
where V ≡ 2pYS − 2ρ represents the NPV when the supervisor is honest.
Conditional on that the lender uses the optimal rigid contract (or the optimal dis-
cretionary contract), the change from individual liability to joint liability increases the
NPV, as suggested by Observation 1 at the beginning of Section 4. In the case of the
optimal rigid contract, joint liability provides a partial insurance in that when only one
project succeeds, the borrower whose project failed does not pay anything (i.e. rFS =0 )
while he has to pay ρ under individual liability. This increase in the NPV from the par-
tial insurance is equal to 2p(1 − p)(ψ(ρ) − ρ). In the case of the optimal discretionary
contract, the introduction of joint liability does not aﬀect any insurance provision since
full insurance is provided regardless of the type of liability. However, it reduces the cost
of audit: by making the borrowers￿ total repayment when both projects succeed equal to
t h ep a y m e n tw h e no n l yo n es u c c e e d s( i . e . ∆2 =0 ), the lender needs to conduct audit
only when both projects fail. By contrast, under individual liability, the lender should
conduct audit whenever at least one project fails. The reduction in the audit cost is equal
to 2p(1 − p)k.
We also ￿nd that joint liability makes a discretionary contract more likely to be optimal
since if a discretionary contract is optimal under individual liability (i.e. (1 + p)k<
2(ψ(ρ) − ρ) holds from proposition 5(ii)), then a discretionary contract is optimal under
joint liability (i.e. k<2(ψ(ρ) − ρ) holds from proposition 4(ii)).
Summarizing, we have
Proposition 6 When there are two borrowers, suppose A1￿, w =0 , (1−p)(3−p)k ≤ 2ρ
and ψ(r)=θr with θ > 1.
40We abuse a little bit the terminology by using the term ￿the optimal discretionary contract￿ in the
following sense. Although the contract is the optimal one among all the discretionary contracts if it is
better than the optimal rigid contract, it may not be optimal among discretionary contracts if it is worse
than the optimal rigid contract.
26(i) When the supervisor is honest, joint liability does not aﬀect the ￿nancing cost.
(ii) When the supervisor can misbehave, it is strictly optimal to introduce joint liability
since it either reduces the ￿nancing cost or provides borrowers with more insurance.
(iii) A discretionary contract is more likely optimal under joint liability than under indi-
vidual liability.
4.5 Joint liability versus mutual insurance
Up to now, we have not considered the possibility that two borrowers can sign a side-
contract between themselves. Actually, Laﬀont and N￿Guessan (2000), Laﬀont (2003),
Laﬀont and Rey (2003) and Rai and Sj￿str￿m (2004) consider side-contracting. In our
model, if the lender uses individual liability, then the borrowers might have an interest to
sign a side-contract to provide mutual insurance. More precisely, consider the following
timing in which after accepting the lending contract and before the realization of the state
of nature, the borrowers sign a binding side-contract which speci￿es a state-contingent
side-payment between themselves. Since the lending contract and the agents are sym-
metric, a side-contract does not need to specify any side-payment when both projects
succeed or both fail.41 Hence, a side-contract only speci￿es a monetary transfer x that a
borrower whose project succeeds makes to a borrower whose project fails such that the
latter uses x to make his repayment to the lender. Note ￿rst that given a grand-contract,
side-contracting has no impact on the supervisor￿s incentive since it does not aﬀect the
borrowers￿ total payment schedule.
Consider ￿rst joint liability. Then, we can show in two steps that the optimal grand-
contract without side-contracting that we characterized in proposition 4 is still the optimal
contract even though the borrowers can sign a side-contract. First, we can prove that there
is no loss of generality in restricting attention to the lending contracts which induce no
side-contracting (i.e. x =0 ). This is what is called the collusion-proofness principle42 in
the literature on mechanism design under collusion and this principle holds in our context
for the following reason. Suppose that a grand-contract GJ = {rSS,r SF,r FS,r FF,w n,q n}
induces the borrowers to sign a side-contract specifying a side transfer x∗ 6=0as their
optimal response. Then, consider another grand-contract GJ0 which is identical to GJ
except that r0
SF = rSF + x∗ and r0
FS = rFS − x∗. If the lender proposes GJ0,i tm u s t
41Actually, if ψ is strictly convex then a side payment in state FF from a borrower to the other borrower
reduces the borrowers￿ sum of payoﬀs.
42Tirole (1986) is the ￿rst who introduced the concept. For instance, Laﬀont and Martimort (2000)
and Jeon and Menicuci (2005) use this principle to design the optimal mechanism under collusion.
27be optimal for the borrowers to sign a side-contract specifying zero side-transfer (i.e. it
is optimal for them not to sign any side-contract). Otherwise, x∗ cannot be an optimal
response to GJ and we have a contradiction. The collusion-proofness principle implies that
side-contracting simply adds additional constraints to the lender￿s optimization problem;
hence, the lender cannot achieve a strictly better outcome with side-contracting than
without it. Second, it is easy to see that when the lender uses the optimal grand-contract
without side-contracting in proposition 4, it is optimal for the borrowers not to sign any
side-contract since the grand-contract provides full insurance (rFS =0 )a tt h es t a t ei n
which only one project succeeds. Therefore, we can conclude that the optimal grand-
contract without side-contracting in proposition 4 is optimal even when borrowers can
sign a side-contract.
Consider now individual liability. First, we note that the outcomes that the lender
can achieve under individual liability are a subset of the outcomes achievable under joint
liability regardless of whether or not the borrowers can sign a side-contract. Therefore,
the lender cannot obtain under individual liability an outcome superior to the best she can
achieve under joint liability. Second, we can show that if side-contracting is possible, under
individual liability, the lender can achieve the outcome of the optimal rigid contract under
joint liability (see proposition 4(i)a) by oﬀering GI∗ =
'
rS = rF = ρ +
w
2,w n = w,q n =0
“
.
Under GI∗, it is optimal for the borrowers to sign a side-contract specifying x∗ = ρ +
w
2
because it maximizes the borrowers￿ expected payoﬀs. Therefore, GI∗ induces the out-
come of the optimal rigid contract under joint liability. Last, when there is individual
liability, side-contracting does not allow the lender to achieve the outcome of the optimal
discretionary contract under joint liability in proposition 4(i)b. The latter contract spec-
i￿es a repayment schedule such that 2rSS = rSF +rFS > 2rFF =0 .T h i sk i n do fs c h e d u l e
cannot be obtained under individual liability because rSS = rSF and rFS = rFF must
hold and side-contracting has no impact on the total repayment schedule. As the table
in subsection 4.4 reveals, the consequence is a higher audit cost under individual liability.
Summarizing, we have:
Proposition 7 When there are two borrowers and A1￿ is satis￿ed,
(i) Under joint liability, the optimal grand-contract is the same regardless of whether or
not the borrowers can sign a side-contract and the possibility of side-contracting has no
impact on their payoﬀs.
(ii) When the borrowers can sign a side-contract,
a. the borrowers￿ payoﬀs cannot be higher under individual liability than under joint
liability.
28b. If a rigid contract is optimal under joint liability, the maximal payoﬀs under joint
liability can be achieved under individual liability by a grand-contact which induces the
borrowers to sign a suitable side-contract.
c. If a discretionary contract is optimal under joint liability, the borrowers￿ payoﬀs
are strictly higher under joint liability than under individual liability.
Proposition 7(ii)b implies that conditional on that a rigid contract is optimal, our
model does not necessarily predict that we should observe the use of joint liability. Actu-
ally, the Grameen bank seems to recently have discontinued its previous practice of joint
liability.43
5 Discussions
Consider the case of a single borrower who can choose between two investment projects
of diﬀerent size, a small one and a large one. The small project is the one described
in section 3. In the large project the borrower invests a(> 1) units of money and the
investment generates the revenue aYS with probability p ∈ (0,1),t h er e v e n u ez e r ow i t h
probability 1 − p. The cost of capital is aρ and, in order to use our result in proposition
2(iii), we assume w =0 . When the supervisor is honest, choosing the large project is
optimal if and only if pYS − ρ is positive because there are constant returns to scale. In
other words, as long as the small project has a positive NPV, it is optimal to choose the
large one. However, when the supervisor can be dishonest, it can be optimal to choose
the small project even though pYS − ρ > 0. Conditional on choosing the large project,
proposition 2(iii) proves that a rigid contract is optimal if and only if k ≥ ψ(aρ) − aρ.
Since this inequality implies k>ψ(ρ)−ρ, a rigid contract is optimal in the small project
if it is optimal in the large project. When a rigid contract is optimal regardless of the
size of the project, choosing the small project instead of the large one is optimal if and
only if (a−1)p(YS −ρ) < (1−p)[ψ(aρ) − ψ(ρ)] and this inequality may hold even though
pYS > ρ. Therefore, staﬀ￿s incentive problem creates a bias in project selection toward
projects of smaller scale.
Suppose now that the borrower can choose between two investment projects of diﬀerent
probability of success: each of them requires one unit of money to invest but has a
diﬀerent probability of success. A (relatively) safe project produces a return of YS with
43See http://www.grameen-info.org/bank/GBGlance.htm. We asked them when and why they elimi-
nated joint liability but got no response.
29probability p and zero return with probability 1 − p. A risky project produces a return
of Y 0
S >Y S with probability p0 (<p ) and zero return with probability 1 − p0.W ea s s u m e
pYS = p0Y 0
S. Therefore, when the supervisor is honest, the borrower is indiﬀerent between
the two projects. When the supervisor can misbehave and w =0 , from proposition 2(iii),
the borrower￿s expected payoﬀ conditional on choosing the safer project is pYS − ρ −
(1 − p)min{ψ(ρ) − ρ,k}, which is strictly larger than the expected payoﬀ conditional
on choosing the riskier project: p0Y 0
S − ρ − (1 − p0)min{ψ(ρ) − ρ,k}. Therefore, staﬀ￿s
incentive problem creates a bias in project selection toward safer projects.
In this paper, we considered a three-tier hierarchy for simplicity. However, when we
add additional layers into the hierarchy, a rigid lending contract is more likely to be
optimal than a discretionary contract. Actually, the hierarchy of the Grameen bank is
composed of head oﬃce, zonal oﬃce, area oﬃce, branch oﬃce, center, group, member. As
long as the total payment that each staﬀ member at the bottom of the hierarchy should
collect does not depend on the realized returns of his borrowers, no staﬀ member at a
higher level of hierarchy has any discretion. Therefore, when a rigid contract is used,
adding layers of hierarchy in our setting involves no extra cost except the minimum wages
paid to the staﬀ. By contrast, when a discretionary lending contract is used, even though
the staﬀ at the bottom are induced to behave well through audit or incentive pays, the
staﬀ at a higher level have also discretion and the bank has to incur additional costs to
discourage embezzlement.
In spite of the bene￿t of protecting borrowers from staﬀ￿s potential misconduct, a rigid
lending contract has the cost of providing poor insurance to them. In the Grameen bank,
this problem is mitigated to some extent by the Group and Emergency funds. The Group
fund is a collective saving from which villagers could borrow when they need a short-term
loan. The Emergency fund is a reserve into which borrowers have to contribute a fee at
the end of the year and has evolved into a form of life insurance. Even though making
each borrower￿s payment responsive to his individual shock can be very costly, making
it responsive to a publicly observable shock aﬀecting a whole region such as natural
catastrophes can be managed in a centralized way with little agency cost. Actually, the
Grameen bank provides Disaster funds to areas aﬀected by natural catastrophes.
Staﬀ￿s career concern is an important factor aﬀecting their behavior. We can incor-
porate it into our model in the following way. Suppose that the supervisor derives a rent
U>0 from having a job in the Grameen bank. Then the incentive constraint (ICSF) in
section 3 is written as follows:
wS + U ≥ (1 − qF)(rS − rF + wF + U),
30which is equivalent to
wS ≥ (1 − qF)(rS − rF + wF) − qFU.
As U increases, the probability of audit necessary to satisfy (ICSF) decreases. Therefore, a
positive rent makes it easier to induce a staﬀ member to behave well. In general, U would
depend on his expectation about how long his organization would survive and what kind
of careers he could make in the organization. As long as a micro￿nancing organization
continues to grow and to maintain its good reputation, its staﬀ w o u l da t t a c hah i g hr e n t
to their jobs and this makes it easier to induce their good behavior.
In our model, the only discretion that a staﬀ member can have is in terms of making a
report about the realized returns. However, in reality, there are other sources of discretion.
In particular, a staﬀ member can exercise his discretion when deciding whether or not
a villager is eligible for a loan or how much loan a member can obtain, etc. This might
induce staﬀ￿s misconduct. Therefore, even though ￿xed repayment schedules are used,
some monitoring of the staﬀ￿s actions should be made. In fact, according to Yunus, his
bank could maintain excellence ￿only if its monitoring system can reach out to all the
remote and dark corners of the system and keep them clean￿. (Bornstein, 1997, p. 171)
6C o n c l u s i o n
Our paper tried to answer the following challenging question: how could one make a
large organization managing a lot of money, such as the Grameen bank, honest while
corruption is a norm in the country? We addressed the question by focusing on the
bank staﬀ￿s incentive to embezzle borrowers￿ repayments and found the rigid repayment
schedules which minimize (or eliminate) the staﬀ￿s discretion as an optimal response. We
also found that joint liability reduces borrowers￿ burden of respecting the rigid repayment
schedules by providing them with partial insurance. However, the same insurance can be
provided by borrowers themselves under individual liability since they have an incentive
to sign a side-contract for mutual insurance. We also found that the staﬀ￿s incentive
problem creates biases in project selection toward projects of small scale and small risk.
Recently, Yunus (2002) announced in ￿Grameen Bank II￿ some changes in the payment
mechanism. The changes are introduced to reduce the tension between a borrower and
his staﬀ member which arises under a rigid repayment schedule when the former has
diﬃculty making his repayment due to bad shocks. Grameen Bank II introduces more
￿exibility into the system and hence gives more discretion to its staﬀ: borrowers can
31reschedule repayments and both the loan duration and the size of weekly installment can
be varied. Our paper explains borrowers￿ burden of respecting a rigid repayment schedule
and suggests that increasing staﬀ￿s discretion may end up hurting borrowers by increasing
the scope for staﬀ￿s misconduct.
Appendix
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2
(i) We have already proved Proposition 2(i)a-b in the text. We only need to verify
that borrower￿s payoﬀ is positive in the optimal grand contract. Since A1 implies that
the payoﬀ is positive in the best contract between the rigid contract and the discretionary
contract with ∆ = ∆max, the payoﬀ is positive also in the optimal grand contract.
(ii) We have shown in the text that ∆∗S ∈
'
max{0,∆},∆max“
and that the optimal
lending contract is determined by comparing p(YS − ρ − w) − (1 − p)ψ(ρ + w) with
p(YS − ∆max). Hence, the rigid contract is optimal if and only if p∆max ≥ ρ + w +( 1−
p)[ψ(ρ + w) − ρ − w]; by recalling that ∆max satis￿es (2), we can write the condition as
ρ + w +( 1− p) ∆
∆+wk ≥ ρ + w +( 1− p)[ψ(ρ + w) − ρ − w], which is equivalent to (8).
(iii) It is obvious that if w =0 ,t h e nﬂ q(∆)=1for any ∆ > 0 and thus ∆∗S = ∆max
because f(∆)=p(1 − p){ψ
0[rstick
F (∆)] − 1} > 0 for any ∆ ∈ [∆,∆max]. The condition
k ≥ ψ(ρ) − ρ comes from (8) when w =0 .
Proof of lemma 4
(i) In (LrJ),( i )q2 appears only in the right hand side of (BE) and q2 =0is the value
which minimizes this right hand side; (ii) w0 appears in the right hand side of (BE) and
in (12), thus w ￿ the smallest feasible value of w0 ￿ most relaxes these constraints.
(ii) We ￿rst show a general result, which is independent of the particular relaxed
problem that is considered. Let ∆n￿ n ≡ R(n) − R(￿ n);t h e n∆￿ nn ≡− ∆n￿ n and ICn￿ n
and IC￿ nn are expressed as wn ≥ (1 − q￿ n)(∆n￿ n + w￿ n) and w￿ n ≥ (1 − qn)(−∆n￿ n + wn),
respectively. We show that if ∆n￿ n ≥ 0 and ICn￿ n is satis￿ed, then IC￿ nn holds as well. This
fact is obvious if wn = w.I f i n s t e a d wn =( 1− q￿ n)(∆n￿ n + w￿ n),t h e nI C ￿ nn reduces to
w￿ n ≥ (1 − qn)[−q￿ n∆n￿ n +( 1− q￿ n)w￿ n] and is satis￿ed.
This result proves that IC01 is satis￿ed in the solution to (LrJ). Regarding IC02 and IC12,
we need to distinguish four diﬀerent cases depending on whether IC20 and/or IC21 bind.
It is clear from the above result that IC02 and IC12 are satis￿ed if either IC20 and IC21
both bind or are both slack. If only IC20 binds, then we know that IC02 holds and IC12
reduces to w1 ≥− q0∆2 +(1−q0)(∆1 +w), which is weaker than IC10.I fo n l yI C 21 binds,
32then IC12 is satis￿ed and IC02 reduces to w ≥− ∆1 − q1∆2 +( 1− q1)w1; this inequality
h o l d si nb o t hi nt h ec a s eo fw1 = w a n di nt h ec a s eo fw1 =( 1− q0)(∆1 + w).
Proof of lemma 5
We ￿rst prove that (IC21) always binds. If (IC21)i ss l a c k ,t h e nq1 =0(otherwise it is
pro￿table and feasible to reduce q1)a n dw2 > ∆2+w1 needs to hold. There are two cases
to consider: when (IC20)i ss l a c ka n dw h e n( I C 20) binds. If (IC20)i ss l a c k ,t h e nw2 = w
and so w2 > ∆2 +w1 is violated. If (IC20)b i n d s ,t h e nw2 =( 1−q0)∆2 +(1−q0)(∆1 +w)
and again w2 > ∆2 + w1 fails to hold because w1 ≥ (1 − q0)(∆1 + w).
Given that (IC21) binds, now we prove that it never arises the case in which both (IC20)
and (IC10) are slack. If this were the case, then q0 =0and w1 = w,s i n c e ,o t h e r w i s e ,
it is pro￿table and feasible to reduce q0 and w1. The inequality w > ∆1 + w would be
equivalent to (IC10) slack, but it fails to hold since ∆1 ≥ 0.
Proof of lemma 6
(i)a. From (IC21)a n d( I C 20) binding and (IC10)s l a c kw eo b t a i n
w1 = w,w 2 =( 1− q0)(∆2 + ∆1 + w),q 1 =1−
(1 − q0)(∆2 + ∆1 + w)
∆2 + w
(21)
Hence, w2 ≥ w and q1 ≥ 0 are equivalent to q0 ∈ [ ∆1
∆2+∆1+w, ∆2+∆1
∆2+∆1+w] and (IC10)s l a c k
reduces to q0 >
∆1
∆1+w. By plugging (21) into the objective function we ￿nd a linear
function of q0 which is minimized either at q0 = ∆1
∆2+∆1+w or at q0 = ∆2+∆1
∆2+∆1+w.I n t h e
second case, which implies q1 =
∆2
∆2+w and w2 = w,( I C 10) is slack and contract η is
obtained. In the ￿rst case, instead, (IC10)i sn o ts l a c k .
(i)b. From (IC10)a n d( I C 21)b i n d i n gw e￿nd
w1 =( 1− q0)(∆1 + w) and w2 =( 1− q1)(∆2 +( 1− q0)(∆1 + w)) (22)
Hence, w1 ≥ w is equivalent to q0 ≤ ∆1
∆1+w and w2 ≥ w is equivalent to
(1 − q1)(∆2 +( 1− q0)(∆1 + w)) ≥ w (23)
From (22) it follows that (IC20) reduces to q1 ≤ f(q0),w h e r ef(q0) ≡ q0
∆2
∆2+∆1+w−q0(∆1+w)
is an increasing and convex function such that f(0) = 0 and f( ∆1
∆1+w)= ∆2∆1
(∆2+w)(∆1+w).
The feasible set F for (q0,q 1) is therefore F =
n
(q0,q 1) ∈ R2
+ : q0 ≤ ∆1
∆1+w and q1 ≤ f(q0)
o
since (IC20)i se q u i v a l e n tt ow2 ≥ (1−q0)∆2 +w1 a n di na n yp o i n to fF (a) (IC20)h o l d s ;
33(b) w2 ≥ (1 − q0)∆2 + w1 ≥ w, thus (23) is satis￿ed. From (22) and (14) we derive the




We now prove the statement in lemma 6(i)b. First notice that no point in the interior of












2(∆1 + w) > 0
This violates the second order condition for a minimum, which requires the Hessian matrix
to be positive semi-de￿nite.
We can neglect any point (e q0,0) on the boundary of F such that 0 < e q0 < ∆1
∆1+w because
Q is linear in q0 and this implies min{Q(0,0),Q( ∆1
∆1+w,0)} ≤ Q(e q0,0). Likewise, we can
neglect any point ( ∆1
∆1+w, e q1) on the boundary of F such that 0 < e q1 <f ( ∆1
∆1+w) because
Q is linear in q1. As a consequence, only ( ∆1
∆1+w,0) may be a minimum point for Q in the
subset of F in which (IC20)i ss l a c ka n da t(q0,q 1)=( ∆1
∆1+w,0) we ￿nd contract β.
(i)c. When all the three constraints bind we have q1 = f(q0) and Q(q0,q 1) is equal to
ﬂ Q(q0) ≡ Q(q0,f(q0)) = 2ρ + p
2(1 − f(q0))(∆2 +( 1− q0)(∆1 + w))
+2p(1 − p)((1 − q0)(∆1 + w)+kf(q0)) + (1 − p)
2(w + kq0)
=2 ρ +2 p(1 − p)kf(q0)+( 1− p)
2kq0 + p(1 − q0)(p∆2 +( 2− p)(∆1 + w))
Since f is convex, also ﬂ Q is so. Hence, ﬂ Q is minimized at q0 =0if ﬂ Q0(0) ≥ 0 (contract
α), at q0 = ∆1
∆1+w if ﬂ Q0( ∆1
∆1+w) ≤ 0 (contract γ), at q∗
0 ∈ (0, ∆1
∆1+w) if ﬂ Q0(0) < 0 < ﬂ Q0( ∆1
∆1+w)
(contract δ).44
(ii) Suppose that ∆2 > 0=∆1.T h e nw1 = w since (IC10)i sw1 ≥ (1 − q0)w. Lemma
5 implies that (IC21) binds and therefore w2 =( 1−q1)(∆2+w).( I C 20) reduces to q0 ≥ q1
and therefore we have q0 = q1 because q0 >q 1 implies that both (IC10)a n d( I C 20)a r e
slack, violating lemma 5. Thus, q1 = q0 ≤ ∆2
∆2+w in order to satisfy w2 ≥ w.T h eo b j e c t i v e
function is then 2ρ+ p2(1 − q0)(∆2 +w)+2 p(1 −p)(w + kq0)+( 1− p)2(w + kq0),w h i c h
is linear with respect to q0 ∈ [0, ∆2
∆2+w].T h u s , t h e o p t i m a l q0 is either 0 or ∆2
∆2+w and
contract α is obtained for q0 =0 , contract η for q0 = ∆2
∆2+w.
Suppose that ∆2 = ∆1 =0 . Then all incentive constraints are satis￿ed with w2 = w1 = w,




(∆2+(1−x)(∆1+w))2 +( 1− p)2k − p(p∆2 +( 2− p)(∆1 + w)), the condition ﬂ Q0(0) <
0 < ﬂ Q0( ∆1
∆1+w) is equivalent to the condition mentioned in footnote 35.
34Suppose that ∆2 =0< ∆1. Then, (IC21) is redundant because (IC20)a n d( I C 10)j o i n t l y
imply that (IC21)i ss a t i s ￿ed; hence, q1 =0 .N o t i c e t h a t ( I C 20)a n d( I C 10) reduce to
w1 ≥ (1−q0)(∆1+w) and w2 ≥ (1−q0)(∆1+w), respectively, and either they both bind
or are both slack. But by Lemma 5 both bind. We plug w2 = w1 =( 1− q0)(∆1 + w)
into (9), with q0 ∈ [0, ∆1
∆1+w]. Since the objective function is linear in q0,w e￿nd either
contract α or β.
Proof of lemma 7
In this proof we suppose that YS is suﬃciently large so that lemma 3 applies. Suppose
that G =( R(0),R(1),R(2),w 0,w 1,w 2,q 0,q 1,q 2) is such that ∆2 > 0.W e￿nd G0 which
is weakly better than G and satis￿es ∆0





2−p ε, R0(0) = R(0) for a small ε > 0 and q0
n = qn for n =0 ,1,2.I n G0,t h e
borrowers￿ payoﬀ a n de x p e c t e dp a y m e n ta r eu n c h a n g e da n d∆0








2−p ε. We now determine wages w0
2,w0
1,w0
0 such that G0 satis￿es
(BE), and thus it is feasible, and yields the expected wage bill that is weakly smaller than
the one under G.45 B yl e m m a6 ,w en e e dt od i s t i n g u i s ht h r e ed i ﬀerent cases depending
on whether the binding constraints in (12) are (i) IC20 and IC21; (ii) IC10 and IC21; (iii)
IC21,I C 20 and IC10.I nc a s e( i ) ,b o t hI C 20 and IC21 are relaxed in G0 with respect to G,
thus we can choose w0
2 = w2,w0
1 = w1,w 0
0 = w0. In case (ii) we set w0




2 = w2 +(1− q1)[−ε +(1− q0)
p
2−pε], thus the change in the expected wage paid to
the supervisor is








In order to show that (24) is negative, notice that from IC21 binding and IC20 slack it
follows that (1−q1)(∆2+w1) > (1−q0)(∆2+∆1+w) and then 1−q1 > 1−q0.T h u s ,( 2 4 )






2−p ε ≤ 0.I n
case (iii), we pick w0
1 = w1 +(1−q0)
p
2−pε and w0
2 = w2 −(1−q0)
2(1−p)
2−p ε because the right
hand side of IC20 decreases by (1−q0)
2(1−p)
2−p ε while the right hand side of IC21 decreases by
(1−q1)[ε−(1−q0)
p
2−pε] and 1−q1 > 1−q0 implies (1−q0)
2(1−p)
2−p ε ≤ (1−q1)[ε−(1−q0)
p
2−pε].
The change in the expected wage bill is 2p(1 − p)(1 − q0)
p
2−pε − p2(1 − q0)
2(1−p)
2−p ε =0 .
In this way we have proved that whenever a lending contract is such that ∆2 > 0,w e
can ￿nd another contract which is at least as good and has a smaller ∆2. Ultimately, this
45In some cases the expected wage bill is strictly smaller than the one under G. Then, it is possible to
strictly increase the borrowers￿ payoﬀ by reducing R0(2), R0(1) and R0(0) by a same amount.
35allows to look for the optimal contract within the set of contracts which satisfy ∆20 =0 .
When ∆2 =0 , lemma 6(ii) establishes that the optimal supervisory contract belongs to
{α,β,η}. However, it is straightforward to see that β = η if ∆2 =0and so we restrict
our attention to {α,β}.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n4
(i) The proof of Proposition 4(i)a-b appears in the text. In order to verify that the
borrowers￿ payoﬀ is positive in the optimal grand contract, notice that the payoﬀ under
the rigid contract described in (i)a is 2pYS − p(2 − p)(2ρ + w) − (1 − p)22ψ(ρ + 1
2w)=
2pYS −(2ρ+w)−(1−p)2(2ψ(ρ+ 1
2w)−2ρ−w) and it is obvious that assumption A1￿(i)
implies that this payoﬀ is positive. The payoﬀ in the optimal discretionary contract




1 ] − (1 − p)22ψ(∆
∗β




1 ) by de￿nition of ∆
∗β
1 .F u r t h e r m o r e ,
2pYS − p(2 − p)[2rFF(∆max
1 )+∆max
1 ] − (1 − p)22ψ(∆max




1 ,0) (by de￿nition of ∆max
1 )a n dCJ
β(∆1,0) = 2ρ + w +( 1− p)2k ∆1
∆1+w <
2ρ + w +( 1− p)2k; thus, A1￿(i) implies 2pYS − CJ
β(∆max
1 ,0) > 0.46
Finally, the condition R(1) ≤ YS is satis￿ed by the optimal rigid contract since then
R(1) = 2ρ + w while A1￿(ii) requires that YS ≥ ∆max
1 and (9) implies ∆max
1 > 2ρ + w.









1 and the function 2ρ+w+(1−p)2kﬂ q(∆1)+(1−p)2∆1 is monotone
and increasing with respect to ∆1.T h u si ta c h i e v e si t sm a x i m u ma t∆1 = ∆max
1 ,w h e r ei t
takes the value 2rFF(∆max
1 )+∆max
1 = ∆max
1 ;t h i si sn o tl a r g e rt h a nYS because of A1￿(ii).
(ii) The proof that ∆
∗β
1 ∈ {max{0,∆1},∆max
1 } is straightforward since it follows from
the convexity of (18) over the interval [max{0,∆1},∆max
1 ]. As in the case of proposition
2(ii), we know that if ∆
∗β
1 = ∆1 then the optimal grand contract is such that ∆1 =0and
thus we just need to compare the payoﬀ at ∆1 =0with the payoﬀ at ∆1 = ∆max
1 .B y
using (9) we ￿nd that the former payoﬀ is larger than the latter if and only if kﬂ q(∆1) ≥
2[ψ(ρ + 1
2w) − ρ − 1
2w].
(iii) The proof is very similar to the proof of Proposition 2(iii) and thus is omitted.
Proof of lemma 8
46Notice that A1￿ is more restrictive than needed for the case of joint liability because we want the
same assumption to cover the case of individual liability as well, in which the borrowers￿ payoﬀ is smaller
than the one under joint liability (this fact is explained in detail in subsection 4.4).
36We consider all the possible cases in which ∆1 < 0 and/or ∆2 < 0 a n di na n ys u c h
case we prove that it is possible to (weakly) increase the borrowers￿ payoﬀ by satisfying
∆1 ≥ 0 and ∆2 ≥ 0. In particular, we need to consider four diﬀerent regimes.
1. R(0) ≥ max{R(1),R(2)} (regime B)
Let GB denote the best grand contract within the set of grand contracts satisfying R(0) ≥




2 = w, q0
0 = q0
1 = q0
2 =0 ;t h u s ,GB satis￿es ∆1 ≥ 0 and ∆2 ≥ 0.I ti s
easy to see that G0 is feasible because it satis￿es (10) and (BE). The borrowers￿ payoﬀ in
G0 is 2pYS −p2R0(2)−2p(1−p)R0(1)−(1−p)2ψ(
R0(0)
2 ) because A1￿(ii) implies that YS >
R0(1) = 2ρ + w and thus lemma 3 applies. The borrowers￿ payoﬀ with a grand contract
G such that R(0) > max{R(1),R(2)} or R(0) = max{R(1),R(2)} > min{R(1),R(2)} is
smaller than the one with G0 because of the following argument. First, suppose for the
moment that the expected payment is the same in G as in G0.T h e n G0 is better than
G because of lemma 1, given that R0(0) = R0(1) = R0(2) implies R(0) >R 0(0). Second,
the expected payment in G is actually larger than in G0 because R(0) = R(1) = R(2)
fails to hold and thus some cost must be borne to discourage embezzlement. Third, while
YS ≥ R0(1) holds, it is possible to have YS <R (1) and in this case the borrowers face
some cost from reducing consumption in states SF and FS and not only in state FF.
2. R(2) ≥ R(0) ≥ R(1) (regime C)
We show that within the set of grand contracts satisfying R(2) ≥ R(0) ≥ R(1),t h eb e s t
contract GC is such that RC(0) = RC(1) and therefore ∆1 ≥ 0 and ∆2 ≥ 0 are satis￿ed.
Let ∆20 ≡ R(2) −R(0) ≥ 0 and ∆01 ≡ R(0)−R(1) ≥ 0. We study the following reduced
program in which we consider only IC21,I C 20 and IC01 among the incentive constraints.
IC21 w2 ≥ (1 − q1)(∆20 + ∆01 + w1)
IC20 w2 ≥ (1 − q0)(∆20 + w0)
IC01 w0 ≥ (1 − q1)(∆01 + w1)
A result analogous to lemma 4 holds and establishes that the solution to the relaxed
problem is GC because it satis￿es IC12,I C 02 and IC10.W e p r o v e t h a t GC is such that
∆C
01 =0by showing that starting from any contract G satisfying ∆01 > 0,w ec a n￿nd
G0 which is better than G and satis￿es ∆0
01 =0 . Precisely, let w0
n = wn, q0
n = qn for
n =0 ,1,2 and R0(1) = R(1) + [p2 +( 1− p)2]∆01, R0(2) = R(2) − 2p(1 − p)∆01, R0(0) =
R(0)−2p(1−p)∆01;t h e n∆0
01 =0< ∆01 and ∆0
20 = ∆20. As a consequence, the incentive
constraints are weakly relaxed and the borrowers￿ expected payment is unchanged; thus,
G0 satis￿es (BE). Furthermore, R0(1) >R (1) and R0(0) <R (0).B yl e m m a s1a n d3 ,t h i s
37fact implies that the borrowers￿ payoﬀ is higher in G0 than in G as long as YS ≥ R0(1).
This proves that GC is such that ∆C
01 =0as long as RC(1) ≤ YS. Now we show that
RC(1) ≤ YS holds by ￿nding GC under the assumption that YS is large enough and then
verifying that this assumption holds under A1￿(ii). When ∆01 =0and ∆20 ≥ 0,i ti s
optimal to set (i) w1 = w0 = w because the right hand side of IC01 is not larger than
w; (ii) q1 = q0 = q because if q1 >q 0 (for instance), then it is pro￿table to reduce
q1 slightly. Furthermore, IC21 is equivalent to IC20 and it binds since otherwise it is
pro￿table to reduce q (notice that for values of q close to 0, the right hand side of IC21
is larger than w); this implies q ∈ [0, ∆20
∆20+w]. From (BE) binding we ￿nd R(1) + p2∆20 =
2ρ+w+p2∆20+q[k(1−p2)−p2(∆20+w)], where the right hand side is the ￿nancing cost. It
is clear that this cost is minimized with respect to q at q =0if (1−p2)k−p2(∆20+w) ≥ 0,
at q = ∆20
∆20+w otherwise. In any case, we have R(1) ≤ 2ρ+w and we know that 2ρ+w is
smaller than YS under A1￿(ii).
3. R(1) ≥ R(2) ≥ R(0) (regime D).
We show that within the set of grand contracts satisfying R(1) ≥ R(2) ≥ R(0),t h eb e s t
contract GD is such that RD(1) = RD(2), and therefore it satis￿es ∆1 ≥ 0 and ∆2 ≥ 0.
Let ∆12 ≡ R(1)−R(2) ≥ 0 and ∆20 ≡ R(2)−R(0) ≥ 0. We study a reduced program in




IC12 w1 ≥ (1 − q2)(∆12 + w2)
IC10 w1 ≥ (1 − q0)(∆12 + ∆20 + w0)
IC20 w2 ≥ (1 − q0)(∆20 + w0)
(25)
A result analogous to lemma 4 holds and establishes that the solution to this relaxed
problem satis￿es IC21,I C 01 and IC02.S u p p o s e t h a t G is such that ∆12 > 0.W e￿nd
G0 which is weakly better than G and satis￿es ∆0
12 < ∆12.L e t R0(2) = R(2) +
2(1−p)
2−p ε,
R0(1) = R(1) −
p
2−pε and R0(0) = R(0) with ε > 0 and small; q0
i = qi for i =0 ,1,2.
Hence, ∆0
12 = ∆12−ε, ∆0
20 = ∆20+
2(1−p)
2−p ε and ∆0
12 +∆0
20 = ∆12 +∆20−
p
2−pε.I nG0,t h e
borrowers￿ expected payment is the same as in G and their expected payoﬀ is at least as
large as in G,s i n c eR0(1) <R (1).W en o wd e t e r m i n ew0
i, i =0 ,1,2,s u c ht h a tG0 satis￿es
(25) and (BE). This makes G0 feasible and proves that within regime D, we can restrict
our attention to contracts such that ∆12 =0 , without loss of generality.
A result similar to lemma 5 holds and implies that we must distinguish three diﬀerent
cases, depending on the binding constraints in (25): (i) IC12,I C 10;( i i )I C 12,I C 20; (iii)
IC12,I C 10,I C 20. In case (i), both IC12 and IC10 are relaxed in G0 with respect to G,t h u s
we can pick w0
2 = w2,w 0
1 = w1,w 0
0 = w0. In case (ii) we set w0




1 = w1 +( 1− q2)[−ε +( 1− q0)
2(1−p)
2−p ε], thus the change in the expected wage paid to
the supervisor is








In order to show that (26) is negative, notice that from IC12 binding and IC10 slack
it follows that (1 − q2)[∆12 +( 1− q0)(∆20 + w)] > (1 − q0)(∆12 + ∆20 + w) and then





2−p ε = −
4p(1−p)2(1−q0)q0
2−p ε ≤ 0. In case (iii), we choose w0




1 = w1 − (1 − q0)
p
2−pε because the right hand side of IC10 decreases by (1 − q0)
p
2−pε
while the right hand side of IC12 varies by (1 − q2)[−ε +( 1− q0)
2(1−p)
2−p ε].G i v e n t h a t
1 − q2 ≥ 1 − q0,w es e et h a t(1 − q0)
p
2−pε ≤ (1 − q2)[ε − (1 − q0)
2(1−p)
2−p ε].I nt h i sc a s e ,t h e
change in the expected wage bill is −2p(1 − p)(1 − q0)
p
2−pε + p2(1 − q0)
2(1−p)
2−p ε =0 .
In this way we have proved that whenever the lending contract is such that ∆12 > 0,
there exists another contract which is at least as good and has a smaller ∆12. Therefore,
in regime D we can consider only the contracts such that ∆12 =0 .
4. R(1) ≥ R(0) ≥ R(2) (regime E)
We show that within the set of grand contracts such that R(1) ≥ R(0) ≥ R(2) the
best contract GE is such that RE(0) = RE(2); therefore, it belongs to regime D.L e t
∆10 ≡ R(1) − R(0) ≥ 0 and ∆02 ≡ R(0) − R(2) ≥ 0. We study the reduced program in
which we consider only IC10,I C 12 and IC02 among the incentive constraints.
IC10 w1 ≥ (1 − q0)(∆10 + w0)
IC12 w1 ≥ (1 − q2)(∆10 + ∆02 + w2)
IC02 w0 ≥ (1 − q2)(∆02 + w2)
A result analogous to lemma 4 shows that the solution to this relaxed problem is GE
because it satis￿es IC01,I C 21 and IC20. Suppose that G is such that ∆02 > 0.W e￿nd G0
which is better than Gand satis￿es ∆0
02 =0 . Precisely, let w0
n = wn, q0
n = qn for n =0 ,1,2
and R0(2) = R(2) + (1 − p2)∆02, R0(1) = R(1) − p2∆02, R0(0) = R(0) − p2∆02;t h e n
∆0
02 =0< ∆02 and ∆0
10 = ∆10. As a consequence, the incentive constraints are weakly
relaxed while the borrowers￿ expected payment is unchanged. Further, R0(1) <R (1) and
R0(0) <R (0) and thus, by lemma 1, the borrowers￿ payoﬀ is larger in G0 than in G.T h i s
proves that GE satis￿es ∆02 =0 .
Proof of Lemma 9
39(i) In contract δ, q∗
0 is such that ﬂ Q0(q∗









0)=0(see the proof of lemma 6(i)c). Since f0(q∗
0) > 0,i tm u s t

















In the ￿rst case, δ is not an optimal supervisory contract because it is possible to re-
duce the cost by slightly increasing q0 above q∗
0 and/or by slightly decreasing q1 below
q∗
1 = f(q∗
0). The proof is completed by showing that the second case cannot arise. Indeed,









2(∆ +( 1− q0)(∆ + w)) + 2p(1 − p)k
Then
∂Q
∂q1 ≤ 0 is equivalent to k ≤
p[∆+(1−q0)(∆+w)]





2 p[∆+(1−q0)(∆+w)]. The right hand side
of the last inequality is smaller than −1
2p(1 − p)(2∆ +3 w) < 0 for any (q0,q 1) ∈ [0,1]2.
(ii) It is easy to see that CI
α, CI
β and CI
η are concave. If also CI
γ is concave, then the




η(∆)} follows from Theorem 5.5 in






4{[k(3p − 1)(1 − p) − p
2w]w − [p
2w + k(3p + 1)(1 − p)]∆}
If p ≤ 1
3 or w ≥ k,t h e nk(3p − 1)(1 − p) − p2w ≤ 0 and thus CI
γ is concave. If instead
k(3p − 1)(1 − p) − p2w > 0,t h e nC00
γ(∆) > 0 for ∆ close to 0; CI
γ is convex in [0, ￿ ∆] and
concave in [￿ ∆,+∞),w h e r e￿ ∆ is such that w[k(3p−1)(1−p)−p2w]−[p2w+k(3p+1)(1−




Since CI(∆)=m i n {CI
α(∆),CI
βγ(∆),CI
η(∆)}, we can apply Theorem 5.5 in Rockafellar
(1997) to show that CI is concave.

















d∆ = p2 +( 1− p)2 k
w, the concavity of
CI
β in [0,+∞) and the convexity of CI




∆ ∈ (0, ￿ ∆].
Suppose that ￿ ∆ ≥ ∆00 > ∆0 ≥ 0. Then (27) holds because CI
βγ(∆)=CI
β(∆) for any
∆ ∈ (0, ￿ ∆]. N o wc o n s i d e rt h ec a s ei nw h i c h∆00 > ∆0 ≥ ￿ ∆.S i n c e CI
β and CI
γ are both
concave in [￿ ∆,+∞), (27) is satis￿ed by Theorem 5.5 in Rockafellar (1997).











βγ(∆00).I fi n s t e a dCI
βγ(∆t)=CI
γ(∆t),t h e ni tm u s tb et h ec a s et h a t∆t > ￿ ∆ and there
exists ﬂ t ∈ (0,1) such that ∆t = ﬂ t￿ ∆ +( 1− ﬂ t)∆00.S i n c eCI




γ[ﬂ t￿ ∆ +( 1− ﬂ t)∆00]
≥ ﬂ tCI
γ(￿ ∆)+( 1− ﬂ t)CI
γ(∆00) > ﬂ tCI
β(￿ ∆)+( 1− ﬂ t)CI
γ(∆00)
(28)
Now let ￿ t satisfy ￿ t∆0 +( 1− ￿ t)∆00 = ￿ ∆. Then the extreme right hand side of (28) is at
least as large as
ﬂ t[￿ tCI
β(∆0)+( 1− ￿ t)CI
β(∆00)] + (1 − ﬂ t)CI
γ(∆00) ≥
ﬂ t￿ tCI
βγ(∆0)+ﬂ t(1 − ￿ t)CI
βγ(∆00)+( 1− ﬂ t)CI
βγ(∆00)=ﬂ t￿ tCI
βγ(∆0)+( 1− ﬂ t￿ t)CI
βγ(∆00)
(29)
By combining (28) and (29) we see that (27) holds because ﬂ t￿ t∆0 +( 1− ﬂ t￿ t)∆00 = ∆t and
thus ﬂ t￿ t = t.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n5
(i) The arguments in the text show that the optimal ∆ belongs to {0,∆max
I }.T h e
payoﬀ when ∆ =0is 2pYS−CI(0)−(1−p)[2ψ(
CI(0)




I ).S i n c eCI(∆max
I ) < 2ρ+w+(1−p2)k, A1￿(i) implies
that the payoﬀ in the best of the two contracts is positive. In particular, by comparing
the payoﬀs in the two contracts we see that the rigid contract is optimal if and only if
CI(∆max
I ) − CI(0) ≥ (1 − p){2ψ[1
2CI(0)] − CI(0)}.
(ii) The proof of part (ii) is straightforward, hence it is omitted.
References
ArmendÆriz de Aghion, B. 1999, ￿On the Design of a Credit Agreement with Peer
Monitoring￿, Journal of Development Economics, 60:79-104
ArmendÆriz de Aghion, B. and C. Gollier. 2000, ￿Peer Group Formation in an Adverse
Selection Model￿, Economic Journal, 110:632-643
ArmendÆriz de Aghion, B. and J. Morduch. 2005, The Economics of Micro￿nance,
MIT.
Aubert, CØcile, Alain de Janvry and Elisabeth Sadoulet. 2005, ￿Incentives with
Non-Pro￿t Objectives: Micro￿ancne Agents and the Selection of Very Poor Borrowers￿,
Mimeo, UniversitØ Paris Dauphine and University of California at Berkeley.
41Bazoberry, Eduardo. 2001, ￿We Aren￿t Selling Vacuum Cleaners: PRODEM￿s Expe-
riences with Staﬀ Incentives￿, Microbanking Bulletin, April:11-13.
Besley, T. and S. Coate. 1995, ￿Group Lending, Repayment, Incentives and Social
Collateral￿, Journal of Development Economics, 44:1-18
Calvo, Guillermo A. and Stanislaw Wellisz, 1978, ￿Supervision, Loss of Control and
the Optimum Size of the Firm￿, Journal of Political Economy, 86:943-952
Che, Yeon-Koo. 2002, ￿Joint Liability and Peer Monitoring under Group Lending,￿
Contributions to Theoretical Economics, 2, Article 3.
Conning Jonathan. 1999, ￿Outreach, sustainability and leverage in monitored and
peer-monitored lending￿, Journal of Development Economics, 60:51-77
David Bornstein, 1996, The Price of a Dream, University of Chicago, Chicago.
Diamond, D. 1984, ￿Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring,￿ Review of
Economic Studies, 51: 393-414.
Fantaye, Dawit Kiros. 2004, ￿Fighting Corruption and Embezzlement in Third World
Countries￿, Journal of Criminal Law, 68(2): 170-176.
Faure-Grimaud, Antoine, Jean-Jacques Laﬀont and David Martimort, 2003, ￿Collu-
sion, Delegation and Supervision with Soft Information￿, Review of Economic Studies,
70:253-280.
Gale, D. and M. Hellwig, 1985, ￿Incentive-Compatible Debt Contracts: The One-
Period Problem,￿ Review of Economic Studies, 52: 647-663.
Ghatak, M. 1999, ￿Group Lending, Local Information and Peer Selection￿, Journal of
Development Economics, 60:27-50
Ghatak, M. and T. W. Guinnane, 1999, ￿The Economics of Lending with Joint Lia-
bility: Theory and Practice￿, Journal of Development Economics, 195-228
Jain, Sanjay and Ghazala Mansuri. 2003, ￿A Little at a time: The Use of Regularly
Scheduled Repayments in Micro￿nance Programs￿, Journal of Development Economics,
72:253-279
Jeon, Doh-Shin and Domenico Menicucci, 2005, ￿Optimal Second-degree Price Dis-
crimination and Arbitrage: On the Role of Asymmetric Information among Buyers￿ Rand
Journal of Economics, 36(2): 337-360
Kofman, F. and LawarrØe, J. 1993, ￿Collusion in Hierarchical Agency￿ Econometrica,
61:629-656
Laﬀont, J.-J. 2003, ￿Collusion and Group Lending with Adverse Selection￿, Journal
of Development Economics, 70: 329-348
Laﬀont, J.-J and D. Martimort. 2000. ￿Mechanism Design with Collusion and Corre-
42lation￿, Econometrica, 68: 309-342.
Laﬀont, J.-J and D. Martimort. 2002. The Theory of Incentives: the Principal-Agent
Model. Princeton University Press.
Laﬀont, J.-J and T. N￿Guessan. 2000, ￿Group Lending with Adverse Selection￿,
European Economic Review 44:773-784
Laﬀont, J.-J. and P. Rey, 2003, ￿Moral Hazard, Collusion and Group Lending￿,
Mimeo, University of Toulouse
Laﬀont, J.-J. and J. Tirole. 1991, ￿The Politics of Government Decision Making: A
Theory of Regulatory Capture￿, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 70: 329-348
The Microbanking Bulletin. 2002. ￿Additional Tables for all MFIs and Financially
Self-suﬃcient MFIs.￿ The Microbanking Bulletin 8 (November): 58-85.
Mknelly Barbara and Michael Kevane, 2000, ￿Improving Design and Performance of
Group Lending: Suggestion from Burkina Faso￿, World Development 1060:1089-1127.
Jonathan Morduch, 1999, ￿The Micro￿nance Promise￿, Journal of Economic Litera-
ture, 37:1569-1614
Rai, A. and T. Sj￿str￿m. 2004, ￿Is Grameen Lending Eﬃcient? Repayment Incentives
and Insurance in Village Economies￿, Review of Economic Studies, 71:217-234.
Rockafellar, R. T., 1997, ￿Convex Analysis￿, Princeton University Press.
Stiglitz, J. 1990, ￿Peer Monitoring and Credit Markets￿, W o r l dB a n kE c o n o m i cR e -
view, 4(3): 351-366
Tirole, Jean, 1986, ￿Hierarchies and Bureaucracies: On the Role of Collusion in Or-
ganizations￿, Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, 2:181-214
Townsend, R. 1979, ￿Optimal Contracts and Competitive Markets with Costly State
Veri￿cation,￿ Journal of Economic Theory 21: 417-425
Varian, H. 1990, ￿Monitoring Agents With Other Agents￿, Journal of Institutional
and Theoretical Economics 146: 175-176
Williamson, Oliver E., 1967, ￿Hierarchical Control and Optimum Firm Size￿ Journal
of Political Economy 75:123-38
Yunus, Muhammad, 1998, Banker to the Poor,U n i v e r s i t yP r e s sL i m i t e d .
Yunus, Muhammad, 2002, Grameen Bank II Designed to Open New Possibilities
http://www.grameen-info.org.
43